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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 39 FALL 2002 NUMBER 1
THE ETHICS OF MORAL CHARACTER DETERMINATION:
AN INDETERMINATE ETHICAL REFLECTION UPON BAR
ADMISSIONS
MATTHEW A. RITTER*
INTRODUCTION
There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured
and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake
of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards; 1
In Book II of the Republic, Socrates discusses with his friend Glaucon
the nature of moral character. Glaucon contends that we act morally only be-
cause we risk punishment if we act immorally. Heteronomous ethical re-
straints on our autonomy are sanctioned so as to avoid sanction. To illustrate
his contention, Glaucon narrates an old Greek story, "The Ring of Gyges":
According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king
of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in
the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight,
he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a
hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in
saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human, and
having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead
and reascended.
© Copyright 2002 by Matthew A. Ritter.
* Professor at California Western School of Law, San Diego, California. Bachelor of
Arts, Rice University; Master of Divinity, Boston University School of Theology; Master of
Sacred Theology, Yale Divinity School; Master of Arts, Master of Philosophy, and Doctor of
Philosophy, Yale University; Doctor of Jurisprudence, California Western School of Law.
The author wishes to express appreciation for the research assistance of his students-
Michelle Mitchell, Fred Urban, and Melissa Fernandez.
1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 361b-c (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1945) (360 BCE).
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Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might
send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly
he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them
he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he
became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of
him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again
touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made
several trials of the ring, and always with the same result-when he turned
the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared.
Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were
sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and
with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the king-
dom.2
To the extent that the gygian ring gives its wearer the ability to act im-
morally with impunity, Glaucon argues that anyone who possesses such a
ring would indeed act without ethical restraint.3 For Glaucon, therefore, "the
highest reach of injustice is to be deemed just when you are not."4 In effect,
Glaucon advocates an ethics of "seeming, rather than being, moral."5
Contemporary ethics seems governed as well by a kind of Glauconian
strategy of prudence over principle. Reminiscent of Platonic distress over the
shadowed absence of the Good, philosophers attribute this modern moral
malaise to a recently emergent (post-Enlightenment) ethical indetermina-
tion.6 Ethical indetermination devolves from a moral scepticism aligned with
a cultural diversification, from which scepticism and diversification evolves
the autonomy of the individual as no longer ethically restrained by the heter-
onomy of moral traditions except by choice.7 A moral calculus of self-
interest eclipses any sense of moral obligation to yield an insipid ethics of
"[i]ntractable plurivocity and heteromorphic proliferation."8 Not unlike the
Ring of Gyges, the pragmatics of contemporary ethical conduct dictates
seeming, rather than being, moral in order to achieve desired social ends.
Immoral conduct is merely unseemly.
In light of the current academic eschewal of any ethically determinate
notion of morality, it is perhaps startling that modern professional culture
typically requires its licensees to have demonstrated, in addition to profes-
sional competence, "good moral character" in order to gain membership.9
2. PLATO, supra note 1, at 359d-360b.
3. Id. at 360c ("No man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand
fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely
take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or
kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men.").
4. Id. at 361a.
5. See JONATHON GLOVER, HuMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
20 (2000).
6. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHOSE RATIONALITY? (1988).
7. See Charles Taylor, Democracy, Inclusive and Exclusive, in MEANING AND
MODERNITY 181, 189 (Richard Madsen et al. eds., 2002).
8. JOHN D. CAPUTO, AGAINST ETHICS 222 (1993).
9. "Typical examples of occupations regulated are: ambulance drivers, billiard room em-
[Vol. 39
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Since colonial times in America, good moral character has been singularly
requisite for lawyers to gain membership in a bar association.I" Each of the
fifty one bar associations in the United States requires that applicants dem-
onstrate good moral character as a pre-condition to the practice of law in its
jurisdiction. I1 This is perhaps due to the fact that, as Alexis de Tocqueville
noted after his visit to America in 1830, "attorneys may comprise 'the
American aristocracy' and its 'political upper class.""..2 The U.S. Supreme
Court has attributed it to the unique cultural role occupied by lawyers as the
guardians of our fundamental liberties:
All the interests of man that are comprised under the constitutional guar-
antees given to "life, liberty, and property" are in the professional keeping
of lawyers. From a profession charged with such responsibility there must
be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of
granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility,
that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as
"moral character." 13
Apparently attendant, however, to the ethical obscurity of what good
moral character means, the Court has also expressed a certain uneasiness
with good moral character requirements for admission to the bar: "It can be
defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition will neces-
sarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a
vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predi-
lections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory de-
nial... ."" The deeper ethical concern with a good moral character require-
ment, however, is not whether the operative criteria of good moral character
may be arbitrary and/or vague, but whether the criteriology of good moral
character does not eclipse the very morality it seeks to illumine by obligating
applicants to the practice of law to wear a gygian ring of moral seemliness.
This discussion will critically reflect upon Good Moral Character as a
ployees, attorneys, physicians, pharmacists, nurses, barbers, embalmers, septic tank cleaners,
real estate professionals, accountants, contractors, and sellers of alcoholic beverages.... Oc-
cupational licensing laws typically contain two components, a 'competency component' and a
,character component."' Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing
Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV.
187, 190-91 (1995). "In the exercise of its police power to protect the health, morals, and wel-
fare of the public, the state inquires into the moral character of the applicant." Id. at 191 n.35.
10. "Within the American bar, moral character requirements have been a fixed star in an
otherwise unsettled regulatory universe. Educational standards came and went, but, at least
after the colonial period, virtue remained a constant prerequisite, in form if not in fact." Deb-
orah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491,496 (1985).
11. Brendalyn Burrell-Jones, Bar Applicants: Are Their Lives Open Books?, 21 J. LEGAL
PROF. 153, 154 (1996).
12. Rhode, supra note 10, at 510 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 268 (G. Lawarence trans., J. Mayer ed. 1969) (1864)).
13. Schware v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) (Black, J.).
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professional licensing condition imposed by bar associations upon prospec-
tive lawyers. This article will first delineate the heritage of good moral char-
acter as currently requisite for legal advocacy. It will then set out the juris-
prudence of good moral character requirements as articulated largely by the
U.S. Supreme Court. This article will then explain the general procedure of
good moral character determination as an administrative function of state bar
associations. It will then illustrate how good moral character determinations
have been reviewed in exemplary cases at the Supreme Court level of both
the federal and state (California) judiciary. It will subsequently proffer a cri-
tique of the "post-modem" ethics of moral indetermination within which
good moral character is determined. This article will then bring this critique
to bear upon the administrative adjudication of moral character. It will offer
finally a concluding un-ethical postscript on good moral character determi-
nation.
I. HISTORY OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER DETERMINATION
So you, too, outwardly appear righteous to men, but inwardly you are full
of hypocrisy and lawlessness. 15
The contemporary requirement that men (and very recently, women as
well) who dictate matters of law demonstrate good moral character has his-
torical roots that reach into the ancient subsoil of our culture. When Moses
set about forming the government of Israel, God commanded that he choose
men who, by virtue of their God-fearing and virtuous nature, would properly
enact and enforce the divine will through the rule of law:
You shall represent the people before God, and bring their cases to God;
and you shall teach them the statutes and the decisions, and make them
know the way in which they must walk and what they must do. Moreover
choose able men from all the people, such as fear God, men who are
trustworthy and who hate a bribe; and place such men over the people as
rulers of thousands, of hundreds, of fifties, and of tens. And let them judge
the people at all times.... 16
Aristotle as well advised that public orators-both lawyers and politi-
cians-be men of good character so as to be effective in convincing their au-
dience of the rightness of their arguments:
But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions-the hearers de-
cide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a de-
cision-the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech
demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character
15. Matthew 23:28.
16. Exodus 18:19-22.
[Vol. 39
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look right .... Particularly in political oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds
much to an orator's influence that his own character should look right and
that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hear-
ers.... There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's
own character-the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing aoart
from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.'
In the fifth century C.E., the Roman Theodesian Code required that
"advocates be of 'suitable character' with past lives that were praisewor-
thy."' 8 The earliest licensing regulations were perhaps developed in thir-
teenth-century France, where a university chancellor issued teaching licences
(licentia docendi) in the fields of Law, Theology, and Medicine only to those
candidates examined and recommended by the majority of the masters of the
respective faculties, and new members were to observe the customs and stat-
utes of the guild. 9 In the early seventeenth century, statutory law in England
required that lawyers be "skillful" and "honest. 2 ° In 1874, Parliament statu-
torily required of lawyers an apprenticeship as well as a judicial examination
for fitness. 2' The requirement that professionals in general, and lawyers in
particular, be possessed of good moral character thus has a long lineage that
may readily be traced through our Anglican, European, and Roman ancestry
into Hebraic and Hellenic foundations of American culture.
The enduring societal concern over the morality of lawyers suggests, of
course, a perennial societal anxiety that absent regulation, rule over matters
of law might readily be acquired by persons who would abuse their power
over the life and liberty of the citizenry. Whether devolving from a Jewish
concern for righteousness or a Grecian concern for rightness, the require-
ment that lawyers be possessed of good moral character is animated by a
longstanding cultural suspicion that persons entrusted with the rule of law
may not otherwise be trustworthy.
Early America provides a high and clear instance of this cultural suspi-
17. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC Bk. II, 1378a (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1954).
18. Michael D. White, Comment, Good Moral Character and Admission to the Bar: A
Constitutionally Invalid Standard?, 48 U. CiN. L. REV. 876, 876 (1979).
19. See G. POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT: PUBLIC LAW AND THE STATE
1100-1322 (1964).
20. Roger Roots, When Lawyers were Serial Killers: Nineteenth Century Visions of
Good Moral Character, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 19, 19 (2001) (quoting S.H. BAILEY & M.J.
GUNN, SMITH & BAILEY ON THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 115 (3d ed. 1996) (refer-
ring to a 1605 statute)).
21. See Rhode, supra note 10, at 495. Scholars generally contend, however, that such
fitness requirements had to do more with class than character. See Root, supra note 19, at 20
("This screening process, although facially egalitarian, evolved by 1860 to differentiate law-
yers from the lowest English rabble.") (quoting BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS,
LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
1750-1965, 67 n.6 (1967) ("In 1860, Parliament enacted the Solicitors Act, requiring a pre-
liminary examination for all men seeking admission to the bar. The Solicitors' Journal re-
marked in August 1863 that the clear purpose of the examination was "to exclude from the
profession all who are not gentlemen by birth and education.")).
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cion. Although lawyers were generally well regarded in pre-Revolutionary
America,2 several of the colonies sought to banish them altogether.2 3 Per-
haps due to the fact that many members of the bar had remained loyal to the
British crown and left the colonies during the war, the relatively incompetent
and unscrupulous continued to practice law in the post-Revolutionary pe-
riod; 4 their professional "blood-suck[ing]"25 existence as "cursed hungry
caterpillars [whose fees] will eat out the very Bowels of our Common-
wealth"26 was tolerated only because of the imposition by the various state
bar associations of character requirements,27 as well as apprenticeships
and/or competency examinations.2 8 A nineteenth-century essay on profes-
sional ethics stated the matter pointedly: because lawyers control our "for-
tunes, reputations, domestic peace ... nay, our liberty and life itself...
[t]heir character must be not only without a stain, but without suspicion." 9
Despite such manifest cultural anxiety over the relative societal value of
lawyers, the ability to practice law in the ante-bellum nineteenth century be-
came virtually unregulated.3 °
From 1820 through the Civil War, bar admission requirements became
increasingly less stringent--due to the perceived elitism of extant admission
practices as contrary to democratic ideals.31 The apprenticeship requirements
historically imposed by most jurisdictions had tended to confine applicants
to the well heeled and well connected.32 In 1851, the Constitution of Indiana
stipulated simply that "every person of good moral character, being a voter,
22. HISTORY OF THE COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION, available at http://cbalaw.org/
main.asp?nav=10,8,0&content=aboutContent%2Fhistory%2Easp (Nov. 1, 2002).
23. Rhode, supra note 10, at 496.
24. HISTORY OF THE COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 22.
25. ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 17
(1965) (quoting I J. MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 302 (1927)), quoted by Rhode, supra note 10, at 496.
26. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 83 (1973) (quoting H. LEFLER, NORTH
CAROLINA HISTORY AS TOLD BY CONTEMPORARIES 87 (1956)), quoted by Rhode, supra note
10, at 496.
27. Rhode, supra note 10, at 496-97 ("during the eighteenth century, Massachusetts de-
manded references from three ministers; Virginia mandated certification from a local judge;
and New York and South Carolina provided for examination by the court to determine
whether the candidate was 'virtuous and of good fame' or manifested 'probity, honesty and
good demeanor."'). See also Roots, supra note 20, at 21.
28. Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of
the Justifications for the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1191, 1194 (1995) ("The standards typically included a period of law study under a
practitioner or judge, and varied greatly in length-generally ranging from one to five years.
In some states, the applicant also had to pass some kind of written or oral exam to gain admis-
sion.") (citing CHROUST, supra note 25, at 164-65).
29. G. SHARWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 172 (3d ed. 1869) (1854), quoted
by Rhode, supra note 10, at 496.
30. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of
the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 429 (2001).
31. CHROUST, supra note 25, at 165-66 (1965), cited by Hansen, supra note 28, at 1195.
32. Id.
[Vol. 39
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shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice."33 Ohio
only required applicants to certify that they had "regularly and attentively
studied law."34 Prior to the Civil War, New Hampshire law simply "provided
that any citizen over twenty-one was entitled to be admitted to practice." 35
By 1860, of the thirty-nine states, only nine had any specific requirements
for admission to their bar.3 6 In 1866, the Supreme Court stipulated that "[i]t
shall be requisite to the admission of attorneys and counsellors to practise in
this court, that they shall have been such for three years past in the Supreme
Courts of the States to which they respectively belong, and that their private
and professional character shall appear to be fair."3 7 Attorneys were then
obliged to swear an oath: "I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case
may be) that I will demean myself as an attorney and counsellor of this
court, uprightly, and according to law, and that I will support the Constitu-
tion of the United States."3 The court clarified that attorneys were subject to
no further qualification.39 Although good moral character remained requisite
for admission to the practice of law in many states, bar membership was ef-
fectively open at the end of the Civil War to any and all male citizens who
could produce a personal reference.' As a result, the practice of law in the
nineteenth century had become a good deal more raucous than genteel; beat-
ings, canings, stabbings, and pistol duels among lawyers were neither un-
common nor grounds for disbarment.4
33. THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK
15 (Stuart Duhl ed., 2d ed. 1980) (reprinting Indiana's 1851 constitutional requirement),
quoted by Roots, supra note 20, at 19.
34. Hansen, supra note 28, at 1195 (quoting CHROUST, supra note 25, at 168 (quoting
ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 229 (1953))).
35. Id. at 1196 (quoting ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
FROM THE 1850'S TO THE 1980's, at 9 (1983)).
36. HISTORY OF THE COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 22.
37. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 336 (1866) (emphasis in original).
38. Id.
39. Id. Immediately after the Civil War, Congress had amended the federal bar admission
statute to require attorneys to swear an oath that they had not given aid or held office under
"any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States," which served to pre-
vent lawyers who had practiced law in a Confederate state from membership in the federal
bar. Id. at 335 (citing Act of Jan. 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424 (1865)). The court declared
this further oath requirement to be unconstitutional. Id. at 381.
40. Rhode, supra note 10, at 497-98 ("Reported cases reveal almost no instances of de-
nial of admission on character-related grounds .. "). See also Roots, supra note 20, at 34
("Although the lives of such men as [John Wesley] Hardin, [Andrew] Jackson, and [Judge
Roy] Bean generated an immense historical literature, the record seems bare of any attempts
at barring or disbarring such individuals from the practice of law for their activities outside
the courtroom. Denial of admission and disbarment were generally reserved for court-
room-related conduct or for serious crimes committed in the course of practicing law.")
41. Roots, supra note 20, at 33 ("The practice of law in the nineteenth century, especially
in frontier jurisdictions, was dangerous work, and attorneys contributed to the danger....
Thus wild brawls and bloody feuds were played out in the countryside wherever and when-
ever frontier courts were in session, becoming part of the 'unofficial court docket."') (citing
DICK STEWARD, DUELS AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN MISSOURI 137 (2000)).
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The radical democratization of bar admissions prompted widespread
calls for its reform in the later nineteenth century. On the one hand, there
was increased concern over character certification.42 On the other hand, a
burgeoning post-war industrialization increased concern over the compe-
tency of lawyers to deal with the exacerbated legalization of the social econ-
omy.43 The American Bar Association, founded in 1878, fronted the profes-
sional movement toward establishing more stringent and uniform standards
for both competence and character." The dissenting opinion in a 1906 North
Carolina attorney licensure case articulated an oft-quoted jurisprudential
concern for good moral character requirements at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century:
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
practice of the law unless he possessed an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice, than legal learning. Le-
gal learning may be acquired in after years, but, if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character, the chances are that his
character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace, instead of
an ornament, to his great calling, a curse, instead of a benefit, to his com-
munity. ... The profession of the law is one of the noblest and most im-
portant of all professions. The relation between attorney and client is very
confidential, and often involves matters of the greatest delicacy, and it is
of the highest possible importance to the welfare of the people of the state
that those who are intrusted with their most important and private matters
should be men of upright character.
45
A remark cribbed from an unrelated case written by Justice Holmes in
1907, however, provided the competing concern that such good moral char-
acter requirements express "an intuition of experience which outruns analy-
sis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions-impressions
42. Rhode, supra note 10, at 498-99. See also Hanson, supra note 28, at 1197-98
("Around 1870, professional articles lamented the state of legal training, asking why the legal
profession 'should be so utterly regardless of its own fair name, and careless of the honors
which ought to be connected with the practice of so noble a profession as to admit so readily
horde upon horde ... within its precincts, with scarcely a voucher for the ability or worth,
morally or intellectually, of such applicants as choose to present themselves."') (quoting
STEVENS, supra note 35, at 24 (quoting an article printed in both the Albany Law Journal and
the Western Jurist in 1870)).
43. STEVENS, supra note 35, at 9-10 ("Apparently there was a demand in this country
(after the Civil War)--either from above or below, or perhaps both directions-for a trained
legal profession to operate an increasingly legalistic society.... [Tlhe pendulum began to
swing back (toward standards of formal training), with the refounding of law schools and. in-
creased interest in the more organized side of bar life. Law was beginning once more to be
seen as a learned profession."), quoted by Hanson, supra note 28, at 1197.
44. At the time of its inception the ABA's historical self-portrayal laments that:
"[l]awyers were generally sole practitioners who trained under a system of apprenticeship.
There was no national code of ethics; there was no national organization to serve as a forum
for discussion of the increasingly intricate issues involved in legal practice." ABA HISTORY,
at http://www.abanet.org/media/overview/phistory.html (Nov. 1, 2002).
45. In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 642 (N.C. 1906) (Brown, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 39
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which may lie beneath conciousness without losing their worth."' Navigat-
ing its way between these two concerns, the regulation of bar admissions in
general, and of good moral character requirements in particular, has dramati-
cally accelerated over the course of the twentieth century.47
II. JURISPRUDENCE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER DETERMINATION
The profession of the law is one of the noblest and most important of all
professions.... [I]t is of the highest possible importance to the welfare of
the people of the state that those who are intrusted with their most impor-
tant and private matters should be men of upright character.48
The governing purpose of the good moral character requirement as im-
posed by states for admission to a bar association is twofold: protection of
both the public and the legal system.49 A state's justification for protection of
46. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907). Many scholars are
anxious to note that the operative criteriology of good moral character has historically been
the function more of ethnic rather than of ethical concerns. See Banks McDowell, The Useful-
ness of "Good Moral Character," 33 WASHBURN L.J. 323, 325 (1994) ("In the past, the char-
acter a professional should display was often defined by the class characteristics of the more
successful leaders and went beyond the ethical virtues to notions of civility, demeanor, politi-
cal attitudes, and behavioral style.") (citing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976)). Due to the post Civil War wave
of European immigration, "Roman Catholicism, and, to a lesser extent, Judaism, were widely
viewed as threats to America, which was self-consciously a Protestant country." Stephan L.
Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1194, 1197 (1997) (citation omitted). The advent of programmatic moral character
scrutiny in the late nineteenth century was perhaps more informed by ethnic rather than ethi-
cal interests. "At the close of the nineteenth century, the recently-founded American Bar As-
sociation, joined by various state and local organizations as well as law schools, began spear-
heading a campaign for higher professional standards. While the quest was 'aimed in
principle against incompetence, crass commercialism, and unethical behavior,' the ostensibly
'ill-prepared' and 'morally weak' candidates were often in fact 'of foreign parentage, and,
most pointedly, Jews."' Rhode, supra note 10, at 499 (quoting M. LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM 173 (1977)).
47. Barton, supra note 30, at 431.
48. In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 642 (N.C. 1906) (Brown, J., dissenting).
49. "The primary purposes of character and fitness screening before admission to the
Florida Bar are to assure the protection of the public and safeguard the justice system." Ip-
polito v. Florida., 824 F. Supp. 1562, 1566 (M.D.Fla. 1993). See also Rhode, supra note 10, at
507 ("Those involved in the character certification process have almost uniformly identified
its central justification as protecting the public."); Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural
Analysis of the Good Moral Character Requirement for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 67, 67 & n.4 (1984) ("An additional rationale for the good moral character requirement
is to protect the orderly administration of justice. Although this goal has more frequent rele-
vance in lawyer discipline cases, it is also mentioned as a concern in bar admission cases.")
(citing Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 421 P.2d 76, 87 (Cal. 1966)); Maureen M. Car,
The Effect of Prior Criminal Conduct on the Admission to Practice Law: The Move to More
Flexible Admission Standards, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 367 (1995) ("The overriding justifica-
tion for character screening prior to admission to a state bar is the protection of the public.");
Marcus Ratcliff, Note, The Good Character Requirement: A Proposal for a Uniform National
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the public derives from its constitutionally permissible police power to pro-
mote the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry.5" A state's justification
for protection of the legal system, which serves the twofold purpose of pro-
moting the public image of the law and respect for the law,5 is relatively ob-
scure, but has been judicially permitted out of deference to states' regulatory
self-interest in the orderly administration of justice.52
Competing with a state's concern to protect both the public and the legal
system is a bar applicant's concern to pursue a chosen vocation. Vocational
concern has been recognized as both a liberty and property right constitu-
tionally protected under the due process and equal protection guarantees of
the Fifth Amendment 3 and Fourteenth Amendment.54 "The practice of law
is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning
Standard, 36 TULSA L.J. 487, 490 (2000) ("There are two main theories which have been ad-
vanced as to the purpose the good character requirement serves in today's legal society. The
first and perhaps of the most concern to the states is the protection of the public. The second
and less-frequently cited rationale for the good character requirement is the protection of the
legal system.").
50. "It is undisputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible and substantial inter-
est in determining whether an applicant possesses 'the character and general fitness requisite
for an attorney and counselor-at-law."' Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1973)
(quoting Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159
(1971)). "In their protection of the public health and safety, states 'have broad power to estab-
lish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions."' Johnson
v. State of Kan., 888 F. Supp. 1073, 1080 (D.Kan. 1995) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)). See also May, supra note 9, at 190 ("A state's power to issue
regulatory type licenses flows from the state's police powers with regard to the protection of
the health, morals, and welfare of the public:") (citing Rabino v. Commonwealth, 450 A.2d
773, 775 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) ("determining that a state may impose reasonable conditions
on licenses to protect the public"); Alexander v. Dir., Dept. of Agric., 444 N.E.2d 811 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) (finding that the primary purpose of the licensing trades is the prevention of
injury to the public)).
51. See McChrystal, supra note 49, at 88 (identifying the twin "concerns for the public
image of the profession and for respect for law" as operative in the determination of moral
fitness to practice law, although having no viable relationship to such a determination). See
also Carr, supra note 49, at 379 ("In addition to its strong desire to protect the community, the
bar conducts character screening out of its own interest in upholding its professional and pub-
lic image.").
52. A state "has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an appli-
cant to practice law." Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 725 (1973). Federal courts have
been "particularly chary of intrusion into the relationship between the state and those who
seek license to practice in its courts." Tang v. Appellate Div. of the New York Supreme
Court, First Dept., 487 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
53. "The right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession
free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property'
concepts of the Fifth Amendment." Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
54. "[Tjhe requirements of procedural due process must be met before a State can ex-
clude a person from practicing law. 'A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law
or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Willner v. Committee on Character
and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232,
238-39 (1957).
[Vol. 39
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and his moral character."55 The pursuit of any particular vocation, however,
does not constitute a constitutionally fundamental right. 6 Courts therefore
apply a "rational basis" test to state licensing statutes. 57 The rational basis
test dictates that a state's statutory requirements of competency and charac-
ter for bar admission must bear a rational relationship to the legitimate state
interest in protecting its public and legal system from those unfit to practice
law.5 An applicant to the bar may therefore be denied admission to the bar
only if that applicant is demonstrably a threat to the good of the public
and/or the practice of law.59
The criteriology for -intellectual fitness to practice law varies little
among the states, which typically require completing at least three quarters
of a baccalaureate degree at an accredited college or university, graduating
from an approved law school, and passing a bar examination.6" The criteriol-
ogy for moral fitness to practice law, however, has remained notably inde-
terminate. 6"
No doubt satisfaction of the requirement of moral character involves an
exercise of delicate judgment on the part of those who reach a conclusion,
having heard and seen the applicant for admission, a judgment ... that...
expresses "an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up
55. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971).
56. "Pursuit of a particular occupation is not a 'fundamental right' for purposes of equal
protection strict scrutiny." Thomas v. Bd. of Exam'rs, Chicago Pub. Sch., 651 F. Supp. 664,
671 (N.D. IlL. 1986) (citing Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1320 (7 th Cir. 1977) (Campbell,
J., concurring), aff'd 434 U.S. 356 (1978); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).
57. "[The rational basis] standard... has consistently been applied to state legislation
restricting the availability of employment opportunities." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970) (citations omitted).
58. "A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or
proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have
a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." Schware v. Bd.
of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232,239 (1957).
59. "[A] person cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons." Id. at 239
n.5 (1957). See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 379 (1866) ("The attorney and counsellor be-
ing... clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor. The right which
it confers upon ... is something more than a mere indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the
court, or at the command of the legislature. It is a right of which he can only be deprived by
the judgment of the court, for moral or professional delinquency.").
60. Hansen, supra note 28, at 1202-03. Whether these educational and testing require-
ments bear a sufficiently rational relationship to any demonstrable fitness to practice law has
itself been a matter of rather acrimonious scholarly debate. See, e.g., id.; see also Barton, su-
pra note 30, at 441 ("By guaranteeing that all licensed practitioners are minimally competent,
the regulations arguably address both the information asymmetry-presumably all practitioners
are minimally competent-and the problem of grave harms-minimally competent lawyers will
be less likely to cause such harms. Nevertheless, a comparison between the current entry
regulations and the supposed justification establishes that the regulations are ill-fitted to the
actual problem.").
61. "The Bar Examiners' Handbook candidly admits that 'no definition of what consti-
tutes grounds for denial of admission on the basis of faulty character exist[s]."' Ratcliff, supra
note 49, at 512 (quoting THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 123 (Stuart Duhl, 2d ed. 1980)
(1968)).
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many unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie be-
neath consciousness without losing their worth."62
The indetermination of the good moral character requirement has
prompted constitutional anxiety over its use to exclude bar applicants from
the practice of law:
The term 'good moral character' has long been used as a qualification for
membership in the Bar and has served a useful purpose in this respect.
However the term, by itself, is unusually ambiguous. It can be defined in
an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition will necessarily re-
flect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague
qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilec-
tions, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory de-
nial of the right to practice law. 63
To alleviate the ethical indetermination of the good moral character re-
quirement, some states have employed the negative standard of moral turpi-
tude.64 Conduct that violates generally accepted moral norms evidences
moral turpitude. 65 The Model Code of Professional Conduct, for instance,
defines good moral character ("qualities of truth, of a high sense of honor, of
granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility") in
apposition to moral turpitude ("baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties
which one person owes to another or to society in general"). 66 Construal of
good moral character as goodness versus moral turpitude as badness, how-
ever, scarcely alleviates its ethical indetermination. 67 The more recent Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which suggests that unfitness for the practice
of law may be determined by the commission of offenses involving "vio-
lence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with administration
of justice," fares no better.68 Given their ethical indetermination, reasonable
persons would invariably differ over whether any of these standards is met in
any particular case, as demonstrated by the fact that over 40% of administra-
tive adverse moral character determinations have been judicially reversed or
remanded. 69
Despite the ethical indetermination of good moral character determina-
62. Schware, 353 U.S. at 248 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Chicago, B. & Q R.
Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907) (Holmes, J.)).
63. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) (Black, J.).
64. McChrystal, supra note 49, at 86.
65. May, supra note 9, at 199.
66. Id. at 87 (quoting the official American Bar Association version of the MODEL CODE
OF PROF' L RESPONSIBILITY (2001)).
67. May, supra note 9, at 87.
68. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 8.4 cmt. (2001).
69. Rhode, supra note 10, at 534 ("[Clourts reversed or remanded bar determinations in
43% of all cases, a percentage that has remained relatively constant over the half-century
studied. Criminal convictions, the most common form of misconduct at issue during the last
decade, provoked reversals or remands in 46% of the thirty-nine appeals.").
.[Vol. 39
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tion, courts have categorically refused to find good moral character require-
ments unconstitutionally vague.70 States are permitted broad discretion in
regulating admission to the practice of law.7 Notwithstanding clear constitu-
tional concerns, the federal courts in particular are wary of undue intrusion
into state licensing procedures.72
III. PROCEDURE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER DETERMINATION
[A]n intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many
unnamed and tangled impressions;
73
Although subject to judicial review, the determination of the good moral
character requisite for the practice of law is an administrative adjudication of
state bar associations.74 In addition to completing educational and/or exami-
nation requirements,75 applicants to a state bar association must submit their
character to moral scrutiny. 76 The stated purpose of such moral scrutiny is
protection of both the public and the legal system. 77 "The public interest re-
quires that the public be secure in its expectation that those who are admitted
to the bar are worthy of the trust and confidence clients may reasonably
70. "Long usage ... has given well-defined contours to this requirement .. " Law Stu-
dents Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971).
71. States "have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regu-
lating the practice of professions." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
A state "has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to prac-
tice law." Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 725 (1973).
72. Federal courts have been "particularly chary of intrusion into the relationship be-
tween the state and those who seek license to practice in its courts." Tang v. Appellate Div. of
the New York Supreme Court, First Dept., 487 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416
U.S. 906 (1974).
73. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
74. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS vii (ABA 2002),
http://www.abanet.orgIlegaled/publications/compguide/code.pdf (Nov. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE] ("A body appointed by and responsible to the judicial branch
of government... should administer character and fitness screening."). See also Rhode, supra
note 10, at 496.
75. See, e.g., Staley v. State Bar of Cal., 109 P.2d 667, 668 (Cal. 1941) ("[G]eneral quali-
fications of an applicant should not be substituted for requisite knowledge of law which one
must possess in order to be admitted into the legal profession.").
76. ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, at vii ("The lawyer licensing process is
incomplete if only testing for minimal competence is undertaken.").
77. Id. ("The primary purpose of character and fitness screening before admission to the
bar is the protection of the public and the system of justice .... The public is inadequately
protected by a system that fails to evaluate character and fitness as those elements relate to the
practice of law."). See also Ippolito v. State of Fla., 824 F. Supp. 1562, 1566 (M.D.Fla. 1993)
("The primary purposes of character and fitness screening before admission to the Florida Bar
are to assure the protection of the public and safeguard the justice system."), and Johnson v.
Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1073, 1080 (D. Kan. 1995) (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 792 (1975) ("In their protection of the public health and safety, states "have broad power
to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.")).
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place in their lawyers. '78 The operative assumption is that subjecting bar ap-
plicants to moral scrutiny will help to exclude the unscrupulous from practic-
ing law, thus protecting the public from bad lawyering as well as maintain-
ing the good public image of lawyering. 79 Generally, desirable character
traits include: "honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, reliability, respect for the
law, integrity, candor, discretion, observance of fiduciary duty, respect for
the rights of others, fiscal responsibility, physical ability to practice law,
knowledge of the law, mental and emotional stability, and a commitment to
the judicial process."8 Because responsibility for a state's legal system lies
with the individual states, however, moral character requirements vary from
state to state, both substantively and procedurally.8'
Character scrutiny may be initiated by a state bar association while the
applicant is in law school, prior to sitting for the bar examination, or subse-
quent to successful completion of the bar examination.8" An applicant must
first file an extensive moral character application.83 In most states, the bar
association processes the application; in fourteen states, however, a separate
agency performs this administrative task.84 If the applicant's moral character
application is problematic in any way, it typically triggers a heightened scru-
tiny by an administrative ethics committee.85 Most states have published
78. ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, at vii; accord Vaughan v. State Bar of
Cal., 284 P. 909, 911 (Cal. 1930) ("[T]hose seeking admission to practice law must be pos-
sessed of unquestioned good character and be above suspicion in dealings with public, par-
ticularly those with whom they will come in the closer relationship of attorney and client.").
79. Richard R. Arnold, Jr., Presumptive Disqualification and Prior Unlawful Conduct:
The Danger of Unpredictable Character Standards for Bar Applicants, 1997 UTAH L. REV.
63, 67 (1997) ("In addition to protecting the public, the bar also desires to protect its own im-
age and that of the legal profession generally.").
80. Ratcliff, supra note 49, at 495 (citing Daniel C. Brennan, Defining Moral Character
and Fitness, 58 BAR EXAM'R 4, 24, 25-26 (1989)). See, e.g., In re Gossage, 5 P.3d 186, 196
(Cal. 2000) ("Attorneys must possess good moral character. Good moral character includes
traits of honesty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness, observance of fiduciary responsibility, re-
spect for and obedience to the laws of the state and the nation, and respect for the rights of
others and for the judicial process.") (citing CALIFORNIA RULES OF ADMISSION, RULE X, § 1).
But see ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, chart 11 (2002) (indicating that eighteen
states do not publish a detail of what constitutes good moral character).
81. See ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, at vii-viii ("Some variation in rules
and interpretations among the bar examining authorities may be appropriate, as character and
fitness screening is the responsibility of each individual bar examining authority. Standards
should be applied in a consistent manner and interpretive material should be developed in fur-
therance of this objective."). See also Ratcliff, supra note 49, at 495 ("While [published stan-
dards] are stated as being relevant in the assessment of character in many jurisdictions, how
each individual jurisdiction follows these considerations differs substantially." (citing R. J.
Gerber, Moral Character: Inquiries Without Character, 57 BAR EXAMINER 2, 18 (1988)).
82. Ratcliff, supra note 49, at 493 (citing THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 125 (Stuart
Duhl, 2d ed. 1980) (1968)).
83. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF ADMISSION, R. X, available at http://webserver.
firstecc.comlcaliforniabars/html/2admrule.htm#x (Nov. 1, 2002).
84. ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, chart 11.
85. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF ADMISSION, R. X.
[Vol. 39.
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standards of character and fitness so as to alert applicants to the possibility of
heightened scrutiny; twenty-three states, however, do not publish their stan-
dards.86 Moreover, because states do not publish the rationale of an adminis-
trative moral character determination except when it has been subsequently
appealed and judicially reviewed, how standards are actually employed in
regard to particular kinds of problematic conduct remains relatively ob-
scure.87 In the course of its investigation, an ethics committee may invite an
applicant to an administrative hearing-purportedly informational in charac-
ter; procedural due process demands such an invitation in the event of an ad-
verse moral character determination by an ethics committee.88 The ethics
committee may then either recommend the applicant to the state supreme
court for certification to the practice of law, or not recommend by virtue of
the applicant's lack of good moral character.89 The time required to make a
moral character determination, however, is not bound by due process con-
straints, and therefore remains disturbingly indeterminate. 90 Upon an adverse
moral character determination, the applicant possesses a procedural due
process right of appeal. Initial appeals may be adjudicated by a state bar
court;91 appeals may then proceed to the state supreme court;92 final appeals
86. Id. "There is no consensus among jurisdictions as to what type of conduct bar exam-
iners may find relevant in assessing an applicant's character." Ratcliff, supra note 49, at 495
(citing R. J. Gerber, Moral Character: Inquiries Without Character, 57 BAR EXAM'R 2, 18
(1988)).
87. McChrystal, supra note 49, at 69-70 ("[U]nless bar admission authorities seek to
block an applicant's admission on moral character grounds, the result of the moral character
assessment is generally not reported. Thus, a host of cases in which bar admission was
granted notwithstanding blemishes relating to moral character evade evaluation.").
88. See, e.g., Martin v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs., 661 P.2d 160, 162 (Cal. 1983). But cf
Engel v. McClosky, 155 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the due
process rights of an applicant were not violated by his not being adequately informed of
charges reflecting on his moral character, or given copies of the evidence available to the eth-
ics committee, or given the right to confront the person who had given information to the
committee alleging the misconduct).
89. Although most states do not provide for conditional admission (vis-a-vis substance
abuse, mental disability, debt, criminal history, etc), sixteen do. ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE,
supra note 74, chart II. California does not. Id. Eleven states allow for a deferred admission.
Id.
90. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF ADMISSION, R. X (indicating a minimum of six
months for a moral character determination, but specifying no maximum); accord Engel v.
McClosky, 155 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the good moral
character certification process is not bound by any mandatory time constraints). Moral charac-
ter determinations may therefore range from a few months to several years.
91. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF ADMISSION, R. X. California has two levels of bar
courts, the first serving as a trial review and the second as an appellate review of the moral
character recommendation made by the ethics committee.
92. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6066. Administrative moral character determi-
nations exercise substantial influence on review, but are not binding on the state supreme
court. See, e.g., In re Gossage, 5 P.3d 186, 197 (Cal. 2000) ("[T]he moral character determi-
nations of the [Ethics] Committee and the State Bar Court play an integral role in the admis-
sions decision, and both bear substantial weight within their respective spheres. However, nei-
ther determination is binding on [the Supreme Court]. We independently examine and weigh
15
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may be made to the U.S. Supreme Court. 9 3
The burden of establishing requisitely good moral character initially lies
with the applicant to the bar.94 This is generally accomplished through pro-
viding extensive biographical information,95 personal references, 96 and dis-
closure of all past indiscretions.97 The burden then shifts to the bar to rebut
the evidence, and pass on its sufficiency.").
93. See Craig v. State Bar of Cal., 141 F.3d 1353, 1354 (9 th Cir. 1998) ("Orders of a
State Court relating to the admission of an individual to the state bar may be reviewed only by
the United States Supreme Court on writ of certiorari to the state court, and not by means of
an original action in a lower federal court.").
94. Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Criminal Record as Affecting Applicant's Moral
Character for Purposes of Admission to the Bar, 88 A.L.R. 3d 192, 195 (1978 & Supp. 2000)
("It is well established under general law, constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules of court,
that good moral character is a prerequisite for admission to the bar. It is also generally ac-
cepted that the burden of establishing good moral character rests upon the applicant for ad-
mission to the bar."); accord, e.g., In re Gossage, 5 P.3d 186, 196 (Cal. 2000) ("[B]urden
rests upon the candidate for admission [to the bar] to prove his own moral fitness."); In re
Stepsay, 98 P.2d 489, 491 (1940).
95. Moral Character Applications typically require a thorough and detailed account of
the applicant's life between the age of majority and the time of application, with particular
focus upon academic, residential, employment, financial, military (if any), and medical his-
tory, with heightened inquiry into any problematic history involving extraordinary academic,
administrative, civil, criminal, financial, or medical measures, with particular concern for any
untoward chemical dependency. Given the indetermination of what constitutes good moral
character, the determination of good moral character generally allows for inquiry into any and
every aspect of life. See Rhode, supra note 10, at 583 ("Under prevailing certification stan-
dards, elusive notions of virtue make for expansive state interrogation. As long as the appli-
cant's entire 'life history' is thought relevant in admissions, the scope of bar inquiry is not
readily cabined. Given the vagueness of prevailing standards, applicants are understandably
wary of failing to answer any questions, no matter how tenuously related to practice."). Con-
sequently, "[m]ost certification processes operate without any formal boundaries on their
scope of inquiry." Id. at 575.
96. Good moral character may be evidenced by the testimony of personal references,
most pertinently Professors of Law, Attorneys at Law, professional associates, and other repu-
table personal acquaintances. See, e.g., Pacheco v. The State Bar of Cal., 741 P.2d 1138,
1143-44 (Cal. 1987) ("Traditionally, we have accorded great weight to testimonials submitted
by attorneys and judges regarding an applicant's moral fitness... premised on the notion that
such persons possess a keen sense of responsibility for the integrity of the legal system.").
97. Under ABA guidelines, prior acts that prompt accelerated inquiry are:
" unlawful conduct;
* making false statements, including omissions;
" misconduct in employment;
" acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
" abuse of legal process; neglect of financial responsibilities;
" neglect of professional obligations;
" violation of an order of a court;
" evidence of mental or emotional instability;
" evidence of drug or alcohol dependency;
" denial of admission to the bar in another jurisdiction on character and fitness grounds;
and
* disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency, or other professional disciplinary
agency of any jurisdiction.
[Vol. 39
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an applicant's good moral character with evidence of bad moral character.98
Evidence of bad moral character typically involves past instances of unlaw-
ful conduct, dishonesty (particularly in the bar application process),99 un-
trustworthiness, financial malfeasance, emotional and/or mental instability,
or objectionable political belief and/or conduct.'00 Some states construe any
conduct involving moral turpitude sufficient for an adverse moral character
determination.'' In any event, denial of bar admission may not be puni-
tive; 0 2 rather, the state must show that the prior misconduct renders the ap-
plicant currently unfit for the practice of law.' 0 3 The burden then shifts back
ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, at viii.
98. See, e.g.,CALIFORNIA RULES OF ADMISSION, R. X; accord Greene v. Comm. of Bar
Exam'rs, 480 P. 2d 976, 978 (Cal. 1971) ("The burden of proving good moral character is
upon [the applicant for admission to bar], who must initially furnish sufficient evidence of
good moral character to establish a prima facie case ... [and the] committee then has an op-
portunity to rebut such showing with evidence of bad moral character.").
99. Donald H. Stone, The Bar Admission Process, Gatekeeper or Big Brother: An Em-
pirical Study, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 331, 363 (1995) ("The importance of truth and honesty in
the bar application procedure cannot be overstated."). Compare, e.g., Bernstein v. Comm. of
Bar Exam'rs of State Bar, 443 P. 2d 570, 580 (Cal. 1968) ("[Record as a whole demonstrates
a lack of truthfulness and candor on the part of [applicant] and that he has not shown himself
to be of good moral character."), and In re Wells, 163 P. 657, 661 (Cal. 1917) (holding that
where an applicant attorney concealed and/or distorted various matters of import on applica-
tion for admission and committed a fraud upon the court, he did not possess the necessary
good moral character), with In re Gossage, 5 P.3d 186, 196 (Cal. 2000) ("Whether it is caused
by intentional concealment, reckless disregard for the truth, or an unreasonable refusal to per-
ceive the need for disclosure, [] omission of [criminal history] is itself strong evidence that the
applicant lacks the integrity and/or intellectual discernment required to be an attorney. By the
same token, no adverse effect on admission generally occurs where the applicant omits less
crucial information, where the omission is the product of an innocent mistake, or where the
application is otherwise complete."), and Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 270
(1957) ([I]t is our judgment that the inferences of bad moral character which the Committee
attempted to draw from [applicant's] refusal to answer questions [on application for admis-
sion] about his political affiliations and opinions are unwarranted.").
100. See Arnold, supra note 79, at 67-68, and McChrystal, supra note 49, at 73.
101. McChrystal, supra note 51, at 86 ("Illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, on the
other hand, can be, and frequently is, the basis for denying bar admission."). See, e.g., Gos-
sage, 5 P.3d at 196 ("Persons of good moral character, which must be possessed by attorneys,
do not commit acts or crimes involving moral turpitude-a concept that embraces a wide
range of deceitful and depraved behavior."), and Seide v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 782 P.2d
602, 604 (Cal. 1989) ("The fundamental question [is] whether petitioner is a fit and proper
person to be permitted to practice, and that question usually turns upon whether he committed
or is likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude.") (quoting Hightower v. State Bar,
666 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1983)).
102. Cf. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) ("The question, in the case, is not as
to the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications, but whether that power has been exer-
cised as a means for the infliction of punishment, against the prohibition of the Constitu-
tion."); accord Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, State Bar of Cal., 421 P.2d 76, 87 (Cal.
1966) ("The purposes of investigation by the bar as to moral character of applicant for admis-
sion to the bar should be limited to assurance that, if admitted, he will not obstruct administra-
tion of justice or otherwise act unscrupulously as officer of the court.").
103. "A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character
or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must
have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." Schware v.
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to the applicant to demonstrate that the adverse moral character determina-
tion is either insufficiently evidenced or erroneous. °4 All reasonable doubts,
however, are to be resolved in the applicant's favor.105 Alternatively, the ap-
plicant is obliged to demonstrate "rehabilitation"'° 6-especially so if the
prior misconduct involved unlawful acts.0 7 For purposes of demonstrating
rehabilitation, behavior generally expected of any citizen is not sufficient;
rather, the applicant must exhibit exemplary behavior affirmatively demon-
strative of sincere remorse and rehabilitation over a prolonged period of
time."0 8 The requisite amount of such evidence of rehabilitation, however,
varies according to the relative seriousness of the misconduct at issue.0 9 In
the final analysis, the evidence of rehabilitation must show that the cause of
applicant's misconduct has been eliminated, that such misconduct will there-
fore not recur, and that the applicant is therefore currently fit to practice law.
Although the operative criteria for determining good moral character are
expansively indeterminate, the actual number of applicants denied admission
to the bar on the basis of an adverse moral determination remains quite
small." 0 Applicants most vulnerable to an adverse moral character determi-
Bd. of Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (citations omitted). See also In re Stolar, 401 U.S.
23, 30 (1971); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
170 (1971); Willner v. Comm. on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1963).
104. See, e.g., March v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 433 P.2d 191, 192 (Cal. 1967) ("[Tjhe
burden of showing that findings [of the bar admissions committee that applicant did not pos-
sess the requisite good moral character] are not supported by evidence or that the committee's
action is erroneous or unlawful is on the [applicant].").
105. See, e.g., Seide v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 782 P.2d 602, 604 (Cal. 1989).
106. See, e.g., Pacheco v. The State Bar of Cal., 741 P.2d 1138, 1147 (Cal. 1987) ("'Re-
habilitation... is a 'state of mind' and the law looks with favor upon rewarding with the op-
portunity to serve, one who has achieved 'reformation and regeneration."') (citing In re Peti-
tion of Gaffney, 171 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1946)).
107. Carr, supra note 49, at 384, 386. See, e.g., Gossage, 5 P.3d at 196 ("[W]here appli-
cant [for bar admission] presents a prima facie case of good character and the Committee of
Bar Examiners rebuts with evidence of bad character, the burden falls squarely upon the ap-
plicant to demonstrate his rehabilitation."), and In re Menna, 905 P.2d 944, 948 (Cal. 1995)
("In moral character proceeding, applicant for admission to bar must first establish prima fa-
cie case he or she possesses good moral character; the State Bar may then rebut that showing
with evidence of bad moral character. If it does so, burden then shifts back to applicant to
demonstrate his or her rehabilitation.").
108. See, e.g., Gossage, 5 P.3d at 197 ("Cases authorizing admission on the basis of re-
habilitation commonly involve a substantial period of exemplary conduct following the appli-
cant's misdeeds.") (citations omitted); Seide v. Comm..of Bar Exam'rs, 782 P.2d 602, 603
(1989) (referencing the "exemplary behavior required of one who has committed serious
crimes and seeks admission to the bar" and the requisite "remorse for [] previous criminal
conduct and [acceptance of] responsibility" to demonstrate "rehabilitation"). See also Rhode,
supra note 10, at 545 (regarding the "high premium on remorse").
109. See Carr, supra note 49, at 387; accord Stone, supra 86, at-364 ("Although a record
of a felony conviction does not automatically preclude one's bar admission, the more serious
the misconduct, the greater the showing of rehabilitation required."). See, e.g., Gossage, 5
P.3d at 196 ("[T]he more serious the prior misconduct and the bad character evidence, the
stronger the applicant's showing of rehabilitation must be.").
110. Rhode, supra note 10, at 516 ("[T]he maximum number of individuals excluded in
[Vol. 39
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nation are those who have some history of unlawful conduct."n Historically,
a felony conviction pre-empted admission into any of the regulated profes-
sions; preaching, teaching, or stealing were the only professions routinely
open to ex-felons." 2 Currently, however, a felony conviction operates as an
absolute bar to admission in only three states,"13 and as a temporary bar in
three others." 4 The current trend among most states is that a felony convic-
tion presumptively disqualifies an applicant for admission to the practice of
law, but the applicant may rebut the presumption by demonstrating rehabili-
tation."' This demonstration is subjected, moreover, to a heightened stan-
dard of review in most states, with the applicant bearing a relatively heavy
burden to prove current fitness to practice law.'16 A heightened standard of
any jurisdiction was estimated at twelve to fifteen (California).") (citing Brown & Fassett,
Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 480, 497 (1953)) ("[E]stimates
from New York, Illinois, and California indicating that less than .5% of applicants rejected on
character grounds"), and Shafroth, Character Investigation-An Essential Element of the Bar
Admission Process, 18 BAR EXAM'R 194, 198 (1949) ("California data suggest that about .5%
of applicants were denied admission and .5% abandoned their applications for moral character
reasons."). More recently, the number of applicants denied admission to the California Bar
Association due to an adverse moral character determination ranged from thirteen to sixteen
per year from 1996 through 2000. Telephone Interview with the Office of the President of the
Cal. Bar Ass'n (Fall, 2001). "Although the number of applicants formally denied admission
has always been quite small, the number deterred, delayed, or harassed has been more sub-
stantial." Rhode, supra note 10, at 493-94.
111. Arnold, supra note 79, at 67; see also Zupanec, supra note 94, at 195 ("It is gener-
ally recognized, at least implicitly, in every case in this annotation that the criminal record of
an applicant for admission to the bar may adversely affect the applicant's moral character and
may preclude admission of the applicant to the bar.").
112. See May, supra note 9, at 13-14 n.30, 193 (commenting that the only unregulated
professions available to persons with a felony record were the clergy, university professor-
ships, and burglary) (citing Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 6, 10, 13 (1976)).
113. ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, chart II (Indiana: a felony is prima
facie evidence of bad moral character; Mississippi: all felonies except manslaughter and IRS
violations render an applicant ineligible; Oregon: commission of a crime that would have led
to disbarment renders an applicant ineligible). In 1984, a felony conviction barred admission
to the practice of law in ten states; in 1994, it barred admission in six. Carr, supra note 49, at
368 (citing COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS (ABA 1984, and
1993)).
114. ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, chart II (Missouri: felons may only
apply for admission five years after completion of sentence or probation; Montana: felons
may apply for admission only upon completion of sentence or probation; Texas: felons may
only apply for admission five years after completion of sentence or probation).
115. See Carr, supra note 49, at 383-84; Arnold, supra note 79, at 63; Ratcliff, supra
note 49, at 496-97. But see Zupanec, supra note 82, at 12 ("However, it has also been held,
expressly or by implication, that evidence of rehabilitation and good conduct was insufficient
to establish the good moral character of a bar applicant with a criminal record.").
116. The standard of review under which an applicant must demonstrate rehabilitation
varies from state to state, but is generally heightened in each. See ABA COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE, supra note 74, chart II. California employs a "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard as opposed to the more stringent "clear and convincing evidence" standard required of
re-admittees (persons seeking re-admission to a bar after having been disbarred). See, e.g., In
re Menna, 905 P.2d 944, 950 (Cal. 1995), and In re Murphy, No. 96-V-01909, 1997 WL
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review allows for an accordingly accelerated level of inquiry by the state
into the both the circumstances of the felonious conduct as well as the sub-
sequent conduct allegedly demonstrating rehabilitation."' A threshold re-
quirement for demonstrating rehabilitation in most states is a prolonged pe-
riod of good conduct since the time of misconduct.' An affirmative
demonstration of a rectified moral attitude toward prior felonious miscon-
duct is commonly required as well, evidenced typically by acceptance of full
personal responsibility and genuine remorse for the criminal activity. I19 Lack
of candor about prior misconduct is generally grounds for an adverse moral
character determination,' 20 regardless of whether the conviction has been ex-
18845, *12 (Cal. Bar Ct. Jan. 10, 1997). See also Carr, supra note 49, at 369.
117. See Carr, supra note 49, at 384 ("With a heavy burden resting on the applicant to
prove present moral fitness, this approach allows states to conduct an extensive review of
mitigating and aggravating factors in an effort to make a just determination of an individual's
present moral capacity to practice law."). The ABA has promulgated guidelines for such state
inquiry:
" the applicant's age at the time of the conduct;
" the recency of the conduct;
" the reliability of the information concerning the conduct;
" the seriousness of the conduct;
" the factors underlying the conduct;
" the cumulative effect of the conduct or information;
" the evidence of rehabilitation;
" positive social contributions since the conduct;
" the applicant's candor in the admissions process;
* the materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations.
ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, at viii-ix (stating further that "[t]he investiga-
tion ... should be thorough in every aspect .... ). California considers the following factors:
(1) the nature of the activity; (2) aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (3) any
restitution that has been made; (4) the age and education of the applicant at the
time of the criminal activity and at present; (5) informed opinions of others regard-
ing the applicant's present moral character; and (6) the nature and extent of any
voluntary rehabilitative activities undertaken by the applicant.
Carr, supra note 49, at 388-89 (quoting STATEMENT ON MORAL CHARACTER REQUIREMENT FOR
ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CALIFORNIA 3, Office of Admissions, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia (June 1992)).
118. Five years of good behavior subsequent to the completion of sentence or probation
seems to be the current trend. See ABA COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 74, chart 1I. See
also McChrystal, supra note 49, at 91 ("[T]he most convincing evidence of rehabilitation is
often the simple passage of time without transgressions.").
119. See Rhode, supra note 10, at 543-45 ("Arrogance, 'argumentativeness,' 'rudeness,'
.excessive immatur[ity],' 'lackadaisical' responses, or intimations that a candidate is 'not in-
terested in correcting himself' can significantly color character assessments .... Other courts
and committees place a high premium on remorse.") (alterations in original) (citations omit-
ted).
120. See Carr, supra note 49, at 386 ("In addition to rehabilitation, honesty, and forth-
rightness in the application process are weighed heavily by several admissions committees."),
Rhode, supra note 10, at 544 ("The ultimate sin in many jurisdictions is a failure to seem 'up
front' with the committee. Nondisclosure, even about relatively trivial matters, may evidence
the wrong 'mental attitude,' and 'glib, equivocal responses,' even if technically accurate, may
[Vol. 39
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punged.12' Atonement for past unlawful deeds may also be of paramount
concern, evidenced either by restitution to the victims of the criminal activity
(if possible) or by subsequent socially redeeming conduct (such as charitable
acts). 1 22 On the other hand, some criminal acts are deemed to reflect such a
deep stain on the character of the applicant that admission to the bar will not
prove more damning than the conduct at issue."), and Stone, supra note 99, at 363 ("The im-
portance of truth and honesty in the bar application procedure cannot be overstated.").
121. Bar associations routinely exempt themselves from the right of non-disclosure pur-
suant to expungement and sealing statutes, even in regard to juvenile offenses. See Rhode,
supra note 10, at 577. The stated purpose of such statutes is generally to "erase" the stigma of
the conviction so that it will no longer operate as a hindrance to the personal, social, or pro-
fessional life of the convict by allowing the convict to construe the arrest and conviction as if
it had never occurred. See U.S. v. Fryer, 402 F. Supp. 831, 834 (N.D. Ohio 1975) ("Ex-
pungement is a legislative provision, as opposed to executive, for the eradication of a record
of conviction or adjudication upon the fulfillment of prescribed conditions.... It is not simply
the lifting of disability attendant upon conviction and a restoration of civil rights, though this
is a significant part of its effect. It is rather a redefinition of status, a process of erasing the
legal event of conviction or adjudication and thereby restoring to the regenerative offender his
status quo ante."). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45(a) (West 2002) (sealing a misde-
meanor: "In any case in which a person was under the age of 18 years at the time of commis-
sion of a misdemeanor... may petition the court for an order sealing the record of convic-
tion .... Thereafter the conviction, arrest, or other proceeding shall be deemed not to have
occurred, and the petitioner may answer accordingly any question relating to their occur-
rence."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a) (West 2002) (felony expungement: "[A] defendant
shall.., be permitted by the court to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or plea of nolo con-
tendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if he or she has been convicted after a plea of not
guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty; and, in either case, the court shall there-
upon dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and except as noted below,
he or she shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the of-
fense of which he or she has been convicted.... The order shall state, and the probationer
shall be informed, that the order does not relieve him or her of the obligation to disclose the
conviction in response to any direct question contained in any questionnaire or application for
public office, for licensure by any state or local agency, or for contracting with the California
State Lottery."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4a (a) (misdemeanor expungement: "Every defen-
dant convicted of a misdemeanor shall.., be permitted by the court to withdraw his or her
plea of guilty or nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or if he or she has been con-
victed after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty; and in either
case the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusatory pleading against such defendant, who
shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of
which he or she has been convicted .. ") (emphasis added). Section 1203.4a contains no dis-
closure exceptions as does § 1203.4 for state licensing agencies. The California Bar Ethics
Committee does not exempt itself from the non-disclosure allowance of the juvenile sealing
and misdemeanor expungement; because the Bar Association is a licensing agency, however,
the California Bar Ethics Committee explicitly exempts itself from non-disclosure of felony
expungement. See California Bar Association Moral Character and Fitness Application Form.
122. See, e.g., In re Menna, 905 P.2d 944, 952 (Cal. 1995) ("While restitution 'is not
necessarily determinative of whether rehabilitation has been proven,' it is a legitimate and
substantial factor to be considered 'in the overall factual showing made by the individual
seeking reinstatement."') (quoting Hippard v. State Bar, 782 P.2d 1140 (Cal. 1989)); Seide v.
Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 782 P.2d 602, 607 (Cal. 1989) ("[Plarticipating in community volun-
teer programs to help other substance abusers might well demonstrate a recognition of the
deleterious effects illicit drug sales have upon individuals and the community as a whole.").
See also Rhode, supra note 10, at 544.
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be tolerated, regardless of subsequent redemptive efforts. 2 3
Given both the substantive indeterminancy of good moral character and
the variance of its procedural determination, the judicial review of adminis-
trative inquiry into moral character reveals an unsurprising, albeit disturbing
ethical heterogeneity.
IV. GOOD (AND NOT So GOOD) MORAL CHARACTER DETERMINATIONS
The power [to determine requisite qualifications for the practice of law],
however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleas-
ure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. 124
[W]hen a State seeks to deny an applicant admission... it must proceed
according to the most exacting demands of due process of law. 
125
A. Federal Supreme Court Decisions Regarding Moral Character
Determination
U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving adverse moral character deter-
minations for admission to the practice of law have to date concerned appli-
cants denied certification because of their political posture. In its first sig-
nificant decision on the matter in 1866, the Court refused to permit
congressional exclusion of lawyers from the practice of law due to former
association with the Confederacy. 26 Just after the Civil War, the U.S. Con-
gress enacted legislation requiring attorneys who sought entrance to the fed-
eral bar to swear an oath that they had not given aid or held office under
''any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States,"
which served in effect to prevent lawyers who had practiced law in any Con-
federate state from acquiring membership in the federal bar.'27 The Court
held that although Congress may permissibly impose qualifying standards
upon entrance to the federal bar, such qualifications may not be punitive.' 28
"It rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become
123. Cf. Rhode, supra note 10, at 537 ("[C]ertain illegal acts-regardless of the likeli-
hood of their repetition in a lawyer-client relationship-evidence attitudes toward law that
cannot be countenanced among its practitioners; to hold otherwise would demean the profes-
sion's reputation and reduce the character requirement to a meaningless pretense.").
124. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 347 (1866).
125. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 174
(1971) (Black, J. dissenting).
126. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 336.
127. Id. at 335 (quoting Act of Jan. 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424 (1865)).
128. Id. at 380 ("The question, in the case, is not as to the power of Congress to prescribe
qualifications, but whether that power has been exercised as a means for the infliction of pun-
ishment, against the prohibition of the Constitution.").
(Vol. 39
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one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he
ought to be removed. The power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic
one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it
by sound and just judicial discretion .... ,,129 A century later, however,
sound and just judicial discretion was confronted with the histrionic moral-
ism of the Cold War.
In 1957, the Court decided two cases, which together stood for the
proposition that a state may not deny applicants admission to the bar because
of their political associations. 3 In Schware, the court held that an applicant
was improperly denied admission to the New Mexico Bar because of previ-
ous association with the Communist Party, the related use of several aliases,
and multiple political activity related arrests some thirteen years prior to his
application. 31 The Court found that the applicant had engaged in no miscon-
duct for the past fifteen years, and that his previous allegedly subversive
misconduct was insufficient to justify a present determination of unfitness to
practice law because it had happened many years prior and he had never
been convicted of any criminal activity.32 In holding that the applicant had
demonstrated good moral character, the court stated:
Schware's professors, his fellow students, his business associates and the
rabbi of the synagogue of which he and his family are members, all gave
testimony that he is a good man, a man who is imbued with a sense of
deep responsibility for his family, who is trustworthy, who respects the
129. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
130. Schware v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (Black, J.); Konigsberg v. State
Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (Black, J.).
131. During the Great Depression in 1932, Schware had joined the Young Communist
League; he was eighteen. In 1933 he began work in a glove factory; because the workers were
principally Italian, Schware assumed the name Rudolph Di Caprio which helped him secure
and retain his job, diminish the anti-Jewish prejudice against him, and help organize his fel-
low employees. In 1934 he moved to California to work on the docks; he continued to use an
alias because of anti-Semitism. He remained politically active. While on strike in California
he was arrested for "suspicion of criminal syndicalism," but was never formally charged. In
1937 Schware left the Communist Party but later rejoined. In 1940 he was arrested and in-
dicted for violating the Neutrality Act of 1917; charges were later dismissed. In 1940 he quit
the Communist party. Schware joined the U.S. military in 1944. He was dishonorably dis-
charged in 1950, finished college, and enrolled at the University of New Mexico Law School.
He informed the law school about his past activities and associations with the Communist
party; the dean told him to not worry about such matters because they happened years before.
In 1953 Schware submitted his application to the New Mexico Bar. He answered all questions
and disclosed that he had used certain aliases between 1933 and 1937 and that he had been
arrested several occasions prior to 1940. He was refused entrance to bar examination. He later
requested a formal hearing on the denial of his application. At the hearing he called his wife, a
rabbi, a local attorney, and the secretary to the dean of the school to testify to his good moral
character. He presented letters from almost every student in his graduating class and all his
law professors that were available. The ethics committee determined that Schware lacked the
good moral character requisite for the practice of law. The New Mexico Supreme Court af-
firmed this decision. Schware, 353 U.S. at 236-39.
132. Id. at 243.
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rights and beliefs of others. From the record it appears he is a man of reli-
gious conviction and is training his children in the beliefs and practices of
his faith. A solicitude for others is demonstrated by the fact that he regu-
larly read the Bible to an illiterate soldier while in the Army and law to a
blind student while at the University of New Mexico law school. His in-
dustry is depicted by the fact that he supported his wife and two children
and paid for a costly professional education by operating a business sepa-
rately while studying law. He demonstrated candor by informing the
Board of his personal history and by going to the dean of the law school
and disclosing his past. The undisputed evidence in the record shows
Schware to be a man of high ideals with a deep sense of social justice. Not
a single witness testified that he was not a man of good character. 133
In Konigsberg, the Court remanded, holding that an applicant was not
properly denied admission to the California Bar because of his reputed asso-
ciation with the Communist Party and his refusal to answer questions regard-
ing his political associations.3 4 The Court ruled that the evidence of bad
moral character was insufficient and that the applicant's refusal to answer
questions did not warrant an inference of bad moral character. 3 5 The court
further stated that:
Without some authentic reliable evidence of unlawful or immoral actions
reflecting adversely upon him, it is difficult to comprehend why the State
Bar Committee rejected a man of Konigsberg's background and character
as morally unfit to practice law. As we said before, the mere fact of
Konigsberg's past membership in the Communist Party, if true, without
anything more, is not an adequate basis for concluding that he is disloyal
or a person of bad character. A lifetime of good citizenship is worth very
little if it is so frail that it cannot withstand the suspicions which appar-
ently were the basis for the Committee's action. 136
133. Id. at 240.
134. Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 271. The ethics committee questioned Konigsberg about
his political beliefs and associations. He repeatedly objected to these questions, asserting that
such inquiries infringed on the rights guaranteed him by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. He had worked in various social agencies after receiving his Masters in Social Ad-
ministration, volunteered for the Army and was promoted to Captain. He was honorably dis-
charged and thereafter resumed his career in social work. Suspicion that Konigsberg was or
had been a communist was based on testimony from an ex-communist who stated Konigsberg
had attended meetings of the Communist Party in 1941. In 1950, Konigsberg had written a
series of editorials for a local newspaper criticizing the U.S. participation in the Korean War,
the actions and policies of the leaders of the major political parties, the influence of "big busi-
ness" in American life, racial discrimination, and a U.S. Supreme court decision. The ethics
committee presented no other evidence of any misconduct. At his hearing before the ethics
committee, Konigsberg called forty-two persons who had known him at different periods dur-
ing the previous twenty years. These included a Priest, a Rabbi, lawyers, doctors, professors,
businessmen and social workers, all of which recommended him to the practice of law. The
ethics committee refused to certify him to practice law on the grounds he had failed to prove
that he was of good moral character and that he did not advocate overthrow of the Govern-
ment of the United States or California by unconstitutional means; the California Supreme
Court declined to hear the appeal. Id. at 260-68.
135. id. at 273.
136. Id. at 273-74.
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In 1961, however, the Court established in two companion decisions
that a state may deny admission to applicants who refuse to answer questions
concerning their political associations as an undue obstruction to moral char-
acter determination by the state. 3 7 n revisiting the Konigsberg decision on
its subsequent appeal, the Court held that the applicant's continued refusal to
answer questions regarding his political association with the Communist
Party did demonstrate a lack of good moral character by obstructing proper
moral character inquiry by the bar. 38 The Court stated that with respect to
membership in the Communist Party, "the State's interest in having lawyers
who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its sub-
stantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly suf-
ficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by
compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented."' 39 In Anastaplo,
the Court similarly held that an applicant was not denied proper due process
of law when the Illinois Bar refused to certify him to the practice of law for
refusing to answer questions regarding his reputed association with the
Communist Party because he was duly notified that such refusal would ex-
clude him." "[T]he State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to re-
fusals to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party out-
weighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association, and
hence that such state action does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment."''
In 1971, the Court issued three decisions, holding that although ques-
tions concerning political loyalty to the United States do not chill the exer-
137. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Black, J, dissenting); In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (Black, J. dissenting).
138. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 55.
139. Id. at 52.
140. Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 94-95. At a sub-committee ethics hearing, Anastaplo was
asked several questions over the course of six days regarding both his religious beliefs and
political beliefs regarding overthrow of the government. He refused to answer these questions
because he considered them outside the purview of what the committee was constitutionally
permitted to investigate. This prompted an escalating animosity between Anastaplo and his
examining committee. The committee declined to certify him to the practice of law, despite
offering no other evidence regarding his lack of good moral character. The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed Id. at 85 nn.4-6. "[Anastaplo's] position throughout has been that the First
Amendment gave him a right not to disclose his political associations or his religious beliefs
to the Committee. But his decision to refuse to disclose these associations and beliefs went
much deeper than a bare reliance upon what he considered to be his legal rights. The record
shows that his refusal to answer the Committee's question stemmed primarily from his belief
that he had a duty, both to society and to the legal profession, not to submit to the demands of
the Committee because he believed that the questions had been asked solely for the purpose
of harassing him because he had expressed agreement with the assertion of the right of revo-
lution against an evil government set out in the Declaration of Independence." Id. at 103-04
(Black, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 89-90 (citing Konigsberg H and stating that "it is of no constitutional signifi-
cance whether the State's interrogation of an applicant on matters relevant to these qualifica-
tions-in this case Communist Party membership-is prompted by information which it al-
ready has about him from other sources, or arises merely from a good faith belief in the need
for exploratory or testing questioning of the applicant.").
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cise of free expression and association rights, admission may not be denied
for refusal to answer questions concerning political associations. 42 In both
Baird and Stolar, the Court held that applicants were improperly denied ad-
mission to the Arizona and Ohio Bars respectively because of their refusal to
answer questions regarding political associations with the Communist Party
or any other subversive organization. 4 3 The Baird Court ruled that although
the state has a legitimate interest in determining the moral character of appli-
cants to the bar, that interest does not outweigh "[tlhe First Amendment's
protection of association [which] prohibits a State from excluding a person
from a profession or punishing him solely because he is a member of a par-
ticular political organization or because he holds certain beliefs." 1" The
Court thus construed questions concerning political association as primarily
designed to provide a foundation for exclusion; "a State may not inquire
about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a
right or benefit because of what he believes." '145 Under the same rationale,
the Stolar Court stated that in light of no contravening evidence of bad moral
character, "we can see no legitimate state interest which is served by a ques-
tion which sweeps so broadly into areas of belief and association protected
against government invasion."' 46 In Wadmond, however, the Court held in
declaratory judgment that requiring applicants to the New York Bar to affirm
loyalty to the government of the United States did not impermissibly in-
fringe upon their rights of free expression and association. 147 The Court
142. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (Black, J.); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23,
30 (1971) (Black, J.); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154, 159 (1971) (Stewart, J.) (Black, J. dissenting).
143. After passing the Arizona bar examination, Baird listed all the organizations she
belonged to since age sixteen on the moral character application; however, she refused to an-
swer the question of whether she was ever a member of the Communist Party or any other
organization which "advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Government by force or violence."
Despite no other evidence of bad moral character, the committee refused to process her appli-
cation or recommend her to the bar. The Arizona Supreme Court denied her petition to order
the committee to show good cause for her exclusion. Baird, 401 U.S. at 4-5, 9. Stolar had
been admitted to the New York bar a year prior to applying for admission to the Ohio State
Bar. Although he stated on oral interrogation that he was not and never had been a member of
the Communist Party, he failed to answer questions on the moral character application
whether he advocated the overthrow of the government by use of force or violence, and also
failed to list all organizations in which he was a member, on the grounds that these questions
violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The ethics committee recommended that Stolar be
denied permission to sit for the Ohio bar examination. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
committee's recommendation without opinion. Stolar, 401 U.S. at 27.
144. Baird, 401 U.S. at 6.
145. Id. at 7.
146. Stolar, 401 U.S. at 30.
147. Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 164. An organization of law students and law graduates
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against two committees for character
and fitness for admission to the New York Bar. The organization contended that questions
concerning loyalty to the government to the United States were vague, overbroad, intrusive,
and chilled the free exercise of the speech and association rights by students who must antici-
pate having to answer them. No person involved in the case was refused admission. Id. at 158.
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found that merely requiring belief in the United States' form of government
and loyalty to that government did not evidence an intent to penalize politi-
cal beliefs.'48
Despite the obvious waffling, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that advocation of unpopular, offensive, or even subversive political beliefs
does not alone justify a determination of bad moral character so as to render
an applicant unfit to practice law.'49 The more dissentious issue is whether
questions regarding political association and/or belief are constitutionally
impermissible as an undue state invasion, especially if employed as an ex-
clusionary measure to the practice of law. Justice Black, author of the lead
opinions in each of the cases that restrained the rights of state bar associa-
tions in querying applicants' political posture (Schware, Konigsberg I,
Baird, Stolar), and author of the lead dissenting opinions in each of the cases
that upheld that state right (Konigsberg II, Anastaplo, Wadmond) asserted
that:
[T]he right of a lawyer or Bar applicant to practice his profession is often
more valuable to him than his home, however expensive that home may
be. Therefore I think that when a State seeks to deny an applicant admis-
sion ... it must proceed according to the most exacting demands of due
process of law.
15U
Given such constitutionally stringent due process demands, an accordant
stringency of administrative process in the determination of good moral
character for certification to the practice of law might be expected. This ex-
pectation is frustrated, however, as illustrated in California by even a cursory
review of state court decisions in bar admissions matters.
B. State Supreme Court Decisions Regarding Moral Character
Determination-California
In the eight major decisions rendered by the State Supreme Court of
California from 1966 to 2000 on matters regarding moral character certifica-
tion to the State Bar of California, each remarkably involved a reversal by
the reviewing court of the administrative determination made by the bar.
In 1966, the California Supreme Court in Hallinan reversed the ethics
committee's refusal to certify an applicant for admission to the practice of
law due to applicant's alleged inclination toward violence, disregard for the
148. Id. at 164. But see id. at 176 (Black, J. dissenting) ("The First Amendment was in-
tended to make speech free from government control, even speech which is dangerous and
unpopular. And included within the protection of the First Amendment is the right of associa-
tion; the right to join organizations which themselves advocate ideas. It therefore follows for
me that governments should not be able to ask questions designed to identify persons who
have belonged to certain political organizations and then exclude them from the practice of
law.").
149. See Ratcliff, supra note 49, at 509.
150. Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 174 (Black, J. dissenting).
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rights of others, disrespect for the law, and lack of candor-all in regard to
applicant's political activism and promotion of civil disobedience. 5' The
court not only declined to construe the applicant's record of civil disobedi-
ence as demonstrative of moral turpitude, but found it to be "conspicuously
absent" of moral turpitude and demonstrative rather of the "highest moral
courage.''152 The court further suggested that the ethics committee's adverse
moral character determination was ostensibly governed by invidious dis-
crimination against the applicant's political posture as opposed to a viable
inquiry into his fitness to practice law. 5
3
In 1973, the court in Siegal reversed an applicant's adverse moral char-
acter determination who was denied certification by the ethics committee
because of his lack of candor in sub-committee hearings regarding his al-
leged advocation of unlawful violence in three political speeches he gave
during student demonstrations while in law school.' 54 Although noting the
possible constitutional concerns of obliging an applicant to account for the
content of political speech as effecting a possible chill of First Amendment
rights, the court based its reversal rather on finding a reasonable basis in the
151. Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 421 P.2d 76 (Cal. 1966). Hallinan had been po-
litically active in the civil rights movement and was arrested and convicted numerous times in
connection with his involvement in non-violent demonstrations and other various civil rights
related activities. Hallinan did not deny his acts of civil disobedience, but protested their justi-
fication before the ethics committee on moral and philosophical grounds. Id. at 82-84. Hal-
linan had also been involved in several personal altercations, apparently devolving from his
"pugnacious attitude" as a youth. The majority of these fights occurred many years prior to
his application for admission to the bar, and evidenced nothing more than a quarrelsome dis-
position upon provocation. Id. at 89-94. Since Hallinan's involvement in the civil rights
movement, which was the sole basis for the ethics committee's adverse moral determination,
he had repudiated the use of violence and he had resorted to no violent activity in any of his
acts of civil disobedience. Id. at 94.
152. Id. at 87. The court further explained that violations of laws that contravene the de-
mands of morality are accordingly not crimes of moral turpitude and therefore do not provide
an independent basis for exclusion from the practice of law. Id. at 85.
153. Id. at 86-87.
154. Siegel v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 514 P.2d 967 (Cal. 1973). For much of his life,
but particularly during law school at Berkeley where he was elected president of the Associ-
ated Students of the University of California, Siegel had been a political activist. In three
separate political speeches, Siegel allegedly advocated the use of unlawful violence against
authorities in furtherance of his political causes. The first concerned a dispute with the univer-
sity over use of a park for recreational purposes, which eventually escalated Siegel's urging a
rally of sympathetic students to "take the park," which led to a violent encounter with police.
Siegel was acquitted of the charge of inciting a riot, but the university placed him on discipli-
nary probation for one year. The second concerned a speech in which Siegel addressed at
length, but in philosophical abstraction, the need for violence to effect radical social change;
no acts of violence followed this speech. The third concerned Siegel's speech at a rally de-
nouncing U.S. involvement in Indochina, where he urged the audience to "smash R.O.T.C.,"
which led to a violent confrontation with university police. Siegel was acquitted of the charge
of inciting a riot; the university pursued no action. At the ethics sub-committee hearings,
Siegel denied having advocated violence. The ethics committee based its adverse moral char-
acter determination not on Siegel's alleged political posture, but solely on the fact of his re-
fusal to admit to that alleged political posture. Id. at 973-79.
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text of the speeches for concluding that the applicant had not in fact advo-
cated unlawful violence, as evidenced further by the applicant's acquittal of
all charges of having incited riotous conduct.'55 Given the sub-committee's
extensive questioning of the applicant regarding the specifics of his political
beliefs, moreover, the court suggested that the ethics committee had tread on
rather thin constitutional ice in effectively questioning not merely his candor
regarding his political beliefs, but the political beliefs themselves: "We must
observe in closing that our decision has not emerged from a process wholly
free of troublesome aspects."' 56
In 1979, the court in Hall reversed the adverse moral character determi-
nation of an applicant whom the ethics committee had refused to certify be-
cause of alleged professional misconduct six years prior and the applicant's
lack of remorse and candor regarding the misconduct. 5 ' The court held that
the allegations of misconduct involved relatively unserious matters and that
the ethics committee's insistence that the applicant admit to the alleged mis-
conduct and show remorse in order to demonstrate good moral character was
ethically incongruous:
[The applicant's] consistent refusal to retract his claims of innocence and
make a showing of repentance appears to reinforce rather than undercut
his showing of good character. Precisely because the Committee made
clear that [the applicant's] chances for admission would be improved if he
demonstrated remorse, we find his refusal to do so indicative of good
character rather than the contrary: [the applicant] refused, in effect, to be-
come the fraudulent penitent for his own advantage.
158
The court therefore concluded that the ethics committee's findings sim-
ply did not justify its adverse moral character determination. 59
155. Id. at 982-93.
156. Id. at 984.
157. Hall v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 602 P.2d 768 (Cal. 1979). Prior to matriculation at
law school, Hall had managed an employment agency. He received a disciplinary twenty day
suspension of his agency license from the Bureau of Employment Agencies (despite its own
reservations about the charges) because he had allegedly used undue pressure in collecting
fees owed him from a client (having called the client's employer ten times), failed to refund a
referral fee owed a client, improperly solicited a fee from a client, and used deceptive tech-
niques in obtaining fees owed him from a client. Hall had contested each of these charges at
the time, and maintained his innocence before the ethics committee. He otherwise presented
uncontroverted evidence of good moral character as having a distinguished Air Force record,
honorable discharge, steady employment, residence, and marriage, having raised five chil-
dren, and two testimonials. Id. at 770-75.
158. Id. at 777 (stating further that "[a]n individual's courageous adherence to his be-
liefs, in the face of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision attacking their soundness, may prove
his fitness to practice law rather than the contrary. We therefore question the wisdom of deny-
ing an applicant admission to the bar if that denial rests on the applicant's choosing to assert
his innocence regarding prior charges rather than to acquiesce in a pragmatic confession of
guilt, and conclude that Hall should not be denied the opportunity to practice law because he
is unwilling to perform an artificial act of contrition.").
159. Id. at 778.
29
Ritter: The Ethics of Moral Character Determination: An Indeterminate Eth
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
In 1983, the court in Martin B. reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings the adverse moral character determination of an applicant, which
the ethics committee had based upon his acquittal of two rape charges and
filing a false claim in court ten years prior to his application for admission to
the bar.16 In the course of the ethics committee's moral character investiga-
tion, the state bar court conducted several hearings and re-tried the rape
charges (despite the unavailability of vital records and the ten-year staleness
of the evidence, but at which the complaining witnesses testified) and found
the applicant guilty.'61 On appeal by the applicant, the court held that the
ethics committee proceedings were fundamentally unfair.'62
In 1987, the court in Pacheco again overturned the refusal of the ethics
committee to certify an applicant for admission to the bar due to an adverse
moral character determination based upon allegations of professional mis-
conduct over ten years prior to his re-application to the bar.'63 The court held
that the alleged misconduct was relatively insignificant (if not trivial), of di-
minished probative value (having occurred so many years prior), and that the
applicant's rehabilitation was sufficiently demonstrated by personal refer-
ences and the passage of a lengthy amount of time since his previous alleged
misconduct.164
160. Martin B. v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 661 P.2d 160 (1983). While in the Marine
Corps, Martin B. was charged with the rape of two women. He was acquitted for the one
(successfully showing consent) and the other was dismissed (jury deadlocked eleven to one in
favor of acquittal). He subsequently filed a claim against the United States Government to
recover allegedly stolen property (worth $1,346) and was court marshaled. He continued his
service, was later awarded three medals, and received an honorable discharge. Id. at 161.
161. Id. The ethics committee concluded that Martin B. lacked good moral character not
only because he committed the rapes, but also because he had therefore lied to the state bar
court in advocating his innocence, thus demonstrating lack of candor. The ethics committee
also found his false claim to indicate his bad moral character despite Martin B.'s admission of
guilt, service of punishment, expressed remorse, and the fact that it had occurred ten years
prior. Id.
162. Id. at 166. In regard to the ethics committee's effort to bootstrap its adverse moral
character determination, the court noted that "[a]n individual's courageous adherence to his
beliefs, in the face of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision attacking their soundness, may
prove his fitness to practice law rather than the contrary." Id. at 165 (citations omitted).
163. Pacheco v. The State Bar of Cal., 741 P.2d 1138 (Cal. 1987). Prior to his matricula-
tion at law school while employed as a Highway Patrol officer and then as a private investiga-
tor, Pacheco was allegedly involved in various incidents of improper handling of evidence,
inaccurate record-keeping, suspect loan practices, and one instance of advising a murder sus-
pect how to avoid a subpoena, all of which Pacheco challenged, but in regard to which the
ethics committee therefore found him to be neither candid nor truthful and determined him to
lack good moral character. Two years later, Pacheco re-applied and the ethics committee
again declined to certify him to the bar, finding that he had failed in the meantime to demon-
strate adequate rehabilitation due to his allegedly having used undue force in assisting an at-
torney and his client legally to re-obtain custody over the client's child (Pacheco was accused
of restraining the ex-wife's arm), was insufficiently diligent in de-listing himself from an at-
torney directory (in which he did not place himself and which was made without his knowl-
edge), and remained unwilling to recant his former challenges to the previous adverse moral
character determination. Id. at 1140-42.
164. Id. at 1142-46. Pacheco offered twenty testimonials, nineteen of which were made
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In 1989, the court in Seide declined to certify an applicant for admission
to the bar due to the seriousness of the applicant's drug trafficking convic-
tion five years prior to his seeking admission to the bar and the recency of
his release from probation. 65 Although an initial hearing department had
found that the applicant possessed good moral character, the review depart-
ment reversed.1 66 On appeal by the applicant, the Supreme Court found the
applicant's drug-related activity particularly egregious because he was a
former law enforcement officer and law school graduate, and the applicant's
primary motivation for his drug-related activity was pecuniary, which led the
court to discount the mitigating circumstances of applicant's personal diffi-
culties at the time of his arrest.1 67 The applicant's evidence of rehabilitation,
moreover, consisted only of the testimony of character witnesses who had
not been fully apprised of the extent of the applicant's former criminal activ-
ity. The applicant also failed to show proper remorse for his actions and de-
clined to assume full responsibility for them.'68 Lastly, the applicant was still
on probation at the time of the State Bar hearings and had only just recently
been released at the time of its judicial review, which obviated the appli-
cant's ability independently to demonstrate the exemplary conduct requisite
to overcome the substantial evidence of his bad moral character.
69
by attorneys. The ethics committee had questioned their credibility because Pacheco had not
disclosed his previous misconduct. The court chastised the ethics committee for seeking to
bootstrap its own adverse moral character determination: "We ... question the wisdom of de-
nying an applicant admission to the bar if that denial rests on the applicant's choosing to as-
sert his innocence regarding prior charges rather than to acquiesce in a pragmatic confession
of guilt, and conclude that [he] should not be denied the opportunity to practice law because
he is unwilling to perform an artificial act of contrition."' Id. at 146 (citations omitted).
165. Seide v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 782 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1989). Seide had previously
been arrested five times over the course of seven years for drug-related offenses. He had con-
ducted an extensive cocaine trafficking enterprise for almost a year, involving five transac-
tions of more than a pound of cocaine. He was finally arrested for selling federal agents six
pounds of cocaine (worth approximately $500,000) and convicted of the distribution of 2.845
kilograms of cocaine. He received a three-year suspended sentence with six months actual
sentence, and five years probation. All but the first arrest occurred after he entered law school.
His most extensive drug-related activity took place while studying for the California Bar
exam. Prior to entering law school, applicant had been a deputy sheriff. Id. at 603-04.
166. Id. at 603. Two of the three members of the hearing panel observed that Seide coop-
erated with the investigatory proceedings, expressed remorse for past illegal misconduct, and
had successfully rehabilitated himself, subsequently having earned a reputation for honesty,
reliability, fairness, and trustworthiness. Id.
167. Id. at 604. Seide was gathering funds to invest in a lingerie business. Id. at 604 n. 1.
168. Id. at 605-07. Seide claimed that such drug-related activity was socially acceptable
at the time and continued to insist that despite his drug use he had never suffered a substance
abuse problem; he consequently eschewed therapy, which in the court's view would have evi-
denced rehabilitative efforts toward recognition of the deleterious social and personal effects
of illegal drugs, and refrained as well from any voluntary participation in community sub-
stance abuse programs. Id.
169. Id. at 607 (stating that the conduct required to show rehabilitation must exceed what
would otherwise be expected of an ordinary citizen and further suggesting that supervised be-
havior does not accrue to the credit of a person on parole or probation because exemplary
conduct is required to avoid violation of the terms of the probation or parole). Seide's evi-
31
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In 1992, however, the California State Bar Court held that an applicant
convicted of illegal drug trafficking had sufficiently demonstrated his reha-
bilitation through character witnesses, the shame he felt over his former co-
caine involvement (having developed "great maturity of insight and hind-
sight about his earlier life"), and his cooperation with the prosecution in the
matter.
70
In 1995, the court in In re Menna declined to certify an applicant con-
victed of drug-related activities, fraud, theft, and IRS violations, because of
the seriousness and protracted course of his criminal misconduct and the fact
that his five and one-half years of post-probation behavior was an insuffi-
cient period of time to demonstrate genuine rehabilitation. 171 Subsequent to
his disbarment from the New Jersey Bar, the applicant applied to the Cali-
fornia Bar. The ethics committee recommended against his admission to the
bar for lack of good moral character after its preliminary investigation, but
following an evidentiary hearing the applicant was determined to have good
moral character by the hearing department, which determination was af-
firmed by the review department, but reversed by the Supreme Court on ap-
peal by the ethics committee. 72 The court held that given the enormity of his
previous misconduct, the applicant failed to make a requisitely clear and
convincing demonstration of his rehabilitation by character testimony, ap-
parent recovery from his gambling addiction through extensive involvement
with Gamblers' Anonymous, efforts at making restitution, and his "extreme
sorrow" for his past misconduct.'73 The court further explained that the ap-
dence of rehabilitation was that he had subsequently married, had a child, and held steady
employment. Id. at 605.
170. In re Passenheim, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 62, 67 (1992). -Passenheim passed the
bar examination on his sixth try and was admitted to the California Bar eleven years after his
drug-related misconduct. He subsequently that same year pled guilty to having trafficked in
cocaine and received a two-year sentence with four years probation. He was convicted of dis-
tributing for profit approximately one hundred and ten pounds of cocaine over a two-year pe-
riod. At the time of the judicial review of his admission, Passenheim's misconduct was thir-
teen years prior. Id. at 66-67.
171. In re Menna, 905 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1995). Menna had been a member of the New Jer-
sey Bar Association who had engaged in a continuous course of criminal and professional
misconduct over a period of five years, during which he misappropriated approximately
$250,000 from the trust funds of nineteen separate clients and fraudulently obtained a large
loan from another to pay off gambling debts, devised a scheme to manufacture metham-
phetamine to offset his increasing indebtedness, and wilfully failed to file his state income tax
return. He pleaded guilty to four felony counts, was sentenced to four years in prison, and was
permanently disbarred by the New Jersey Bar Association. At the time of the court review of
his application to the California State Bar Association, Menna still owed $25,000 to his for-
mer law firm, $95,000 to the defrauded client, over $120,000 to the bank that reimbursed the
New Jersey Client Security Fund, and more than $535,000 to the Internal Revenue Service in
tax liabilities and penalties. Id. at 945-46.
172. Id. at 946.
173. Id. at 946-47. The court ruled that because the applicant had been previously dis-
barred in another state, he was required to demonstrate rehabilitation under the much more
rigorous standard than that imposed upon a first time applicant-namely, by clear and con-
vincing evidence-and was not entitled to have all reasonable doubts resolved in his favor. Id.
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plicant' s five and one-half years of unsupervised good conduct (i.e., remain-
ing out of trouble) since his parole from prison was neither a sufficient pe-
riod of time to demonstrate his sincere regret and rehabilitation nor constitu-
tive of exemplary (as opposed to merely unblemished) conduct. 7 '
In 2000, the court in In re Gossage declined to certify an applicant con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter (under circumstances evidencing moral
turpitude) and several other various crimes (evidencing general lack of re-
spect for the law as well as both drug and alcohol addiction), and who failed
to disclose all convictions on his moral character application to the bar. 75
After its preliminary investigation, the ethics committee recommended that
the applicant not be certified for lack of good moral character, but the hear-
ing department reversed, finding the applicant had demonstrated his rehabili-
tation by clear and convincing evidence of remorse, his recovery from sub-
stance abuse, subsequent academic achievement, and community
involvement, and that he now possessed the good moral character requisite
to the practice of law; the review department affirmed. 76 On appeal by the
ethics committee, the Supreme Court reversed and held the applicant was not
presently fit to practice law. 7 The court explained that the applicant's four-
teen years of rehabilitative efforts were insufficiently compelling to over-
come the demonstrative moral turpitude of his criminal conduct, continuing
dishonesty, and disregard for the law. 7 8
at 950.
174. Id. at 952-53. The court declined to credit applicant with his good conduct while
incarcerated or on probation. Id. at 952.
175. In re Gossage, 5 P.3d 186 (Cal. 2000). Twenty five years prior to his seeking ad-
mission to the bar at the age of twenty one, Gossage killed his sister during an argument. Af-
ter beating her to death with a hammer, he stabbed her with scissors, then fled the scene and
concealed the evidence of his crime. He was on probation for forgery at the time and fre-
quently binged on both alcohol and heroin. After two and a half years in prison for voluntary
manslaughter, Gossage reassumed his dissipated lifestyle and was arrested and/or convicted
of various crimes, including driving while intoxicated, theft, possession of heroin, public in-
toxication, forgery, failure to appear in court, and parole violations; he eventually was re-
imprisoned for six months. After his release, Gossage obtained a college degree and then a
law degree. During this time, however, he incurred multiple traffic violations and attendant
misdemeanor convictions for failure to appear in court and non-payment of fines. Of his sev-
enteen criminal convictions, Gossage disclosed only four on his moral character application.
Id. at 180-94.
176. Id. at 188, 195. Evidence of rehabilitation over the course of the fourteen years after
his second imprisonment, Gossage obtained a college and law degree, abstained from illegal
drug use, assisted various non-profit groups dedicated to urban development, volunteered in
various political action groups and a substance abuse program, cooperated with the investiga-
tion of the ethics committee, and expressed remorse for his past misconduct. Twenty wit-
nesses also testified in his support, including prominent political officials, professors, attor-
neys, and mental health experts. Id. at 194-95.
177. Id. at 202.
178. Id. at 198-202. Given the gravity of his misconduct, Gossage bore an equally heavy
burden to demonstrate rehabilitation-especially in regard to the moral turpitude evidenced in
the killing of his sister. The court considered the more recent traffic infractions and Gossage's
mishandling of them as reminiscent of his previous more criminal misconduct, and was
equally disturbed by his lack of candor in the bar admissions process. Id.
33
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Regardless of the character of misconduct over which the ethics com-
mittee of the California State Bar Association has managed historically to
distress itself-whether devolving from the undesirability of an applicant's
political posture, impropriety of an applicant's lack of remorse and/or candor
in regard to alleged professional and/or criminal activity, or insufficiency of
an applicant's demonstrated rehabilitation from felonious behavior (gener-
ally attendant to the morally onerous use of illegal drugs)-the record of its
moral character determinations scarcely evidences "the most exacting de-
mands of due process of law" in avoidance of "passion, prejudice, or per-
sonal hostility." On the contrary, when subjected to judicial review, the re-
cord has evidenced moral character inquiries to be constitutionally
"troublesome," "fundamentally unfair," and "ethically incongruous." In
some cases, the California Bar has refused to certify applicants on the basis
of matters judicially reviewed as morally insignificant-"trivial," "unseri-
ous," or even "conspicuously absent of moral turpitude;" in other cases, it
has recommended certification to applicants despite prior misconduct judi-
cially reviewed as morally debilitating-"particularly egregious," "pro-
tracted" and "enormous," or even "clearly demonstrative" of moral turpitude
as exacerbated by "continuing disrespect for the law." The ethics of moral
character determination seems distressingly indeterminate and scarcely in
accord with the most exacting demands of due process. Albeit distressing, it
is not surprising given the ethos of our time.
V. ETHICS OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
"I do not know what the Good is. Were I of a more apocalyptic frame of
mind, I would say that the time of the Good is over." 17
In its classical form, ethics establishes the moral law for living in accord
with the Good. 8° Historically, the moral law for living in accord with the
Good was a matter of divine dictate; ethics was consequently a theological
discipline: living in accord with the Good was achieved through living by
the Word of God.' "Thou shalt-says the Law."' 82 In the later years of the
eighteenth century, however, evincing ethical distress over the numerous re-
ligious traditions laying claim to moral truth, Enlightenment thinkers sought
to abstract universal moral principles from their religious ensconcement and
179. CAPUTO, supra note 8, at 30.
180. Id. at 4 ("Ethics lays the foundations for principles that force people to be good; it
clarifies concepts, secures judgments, provides firm guardrails along the slippery slopes of
factical life. It provides principles and criteria and adjudicates hard cases. Ethics is altogether
wholesome, constructive work, which is why it enjoys a good name.").
181. See generally Matthew A. Ritter, Universal Rights Talk/Plurality of Voices: A Phi-
losophical-Theological Hearing, in RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 417-82 (Mark Janis &
Carolyn Evans eds. 1999).
182. CAPUTO, supra note 8, at 13.
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therefore provide them a properly rational foundation. 18 3 Ethics thus became
a matter of autonomous moral reasoning rather than heteronomous faith. "I
can-says Kant." '184 Remaining in awe of the "moral law within,"' 8 5 the eth-
ics of the Enlightenment sought to determine the universal norms of behav-
ior through appeal to the common principles of practical reason, thus freeing
moral agency from the dictates of particular religious traditions.'8 6 Enlight-
enment ethics was thus a function of a presumptively rational moral auton-
omy by virtue of which individuals inherit their intrinsic moral dignity as
human.
18 7
Unable to achieve consensus on either its rational means or its moral
ends, however, enlightened skepticism toward its religious traditions landed
ethical reflection not on the solid ground of universal moral normativity but
on the shifting sands of moral relativism.'88 In the latter part of the nine-
teenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche remarked: "Naivete: as if morality could
survive when the God who sanctions it is missing! The 'beyond' absolutely
necessary if faith in morality is to be maintained."' 8 9 Nietzsche proclaimed
the futility of basing moral claims on anything other than the will to do so.
Absent God, moral claims are a function of will, not reason. For Nietzsche,
183. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 6 ("It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment, an
aspiration the formulation of which was itself a great achievement, to provide for debate in
the public realm standards and methods of rational justification by which alternative courses
of action in every sphere of life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational,
enlightened or unenlightened. So, it was hoped, reason would displace authority and tradition.
Rational justification was to appeal to principles undeniable by any rational person and there-
fore independent of all those social and cultural particularities which the Enlightenment
thinkers took to be the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular times and places.").
184. CAPUTO, supra note 8, at 13.
185. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 166 (Lewis White Beck trans.,
Bobb-Merrill Co. 1956) (1788).
186. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 335.
187. Id. ("[T]he project of founding a form of social order in which individuals could
emancipate themselves from the contingency and particularity of tradition by appealing to
genuinely universal, tradition-independent norms was and is not only, and not principally, a
project of philosophers. It was and is the project of the modem liberal, individualist soci-
ety ...."). The ethics of the modem liberal society is rooted in the moral autonomy of the in-
dividual as the primal moral reality. See Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberalism and Virtue, in
PUBLIC MORALITY, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND THE PROBLEM OF MODERN LIBERALISM 55, 86 (T. Wil-
liam Boxx & Gary M. Quinliven eds., 2000).
188. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 335 ("[Tlhe most cogent reasons we have for believ-
ing that the hope of a tradition-independent rational universality is an illusion derive from the
history of that project. For in the course of that history liberalism, which began as an appeal to
alleged principles of shared rationality against what was felt to be the tyranny of tradition, has
itself been transformed into a tradition whose continuities are partly defined by the intermin-
ability of the debate over such principles."). In short, the Enlightenment developed unanimity
neither in the principles of moral reason nor consequently in the principles of morality
whereby a universal ethics of rational autonomy could be established. Id. at 6 ("Yet both the
thinkers of the Enlightenment and their successors proved unable to agree as to what precisely
those principles were which would be found undeniable by all rational persons.").
189. FREIDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 147 (Walter Kaufman ed., Walter
Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967) (1901).
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to rationally justify moral ideas, in particular the idea of the Good, is to
avoid taking responsibility for them. The principle of a moral law accessible
through the moral reason of the individual as constitutive of its moral auton-
omy is not an idea that corresponds to any kind of moral reality. There sim-
ply is no reality that morality is therefore obliged to recognize. In essence,
there is no truth to which morality must rationally conform.
Presupposition of this hypothesis: that there is no truth, that there is no ab-
solute nature of things nor a "thing-in-itself." This, too, is merely nihil-
ism-even the most extreme nihilism. It p laces the value of things pre-
cisely in the lack of any reality corresponding to these values and in their
being merely a symptom of strength on the part of the value-positers, a
simplification for the sake of life. 19
The truth of reality is precisely false: a fiction imposed upon existence
for purposes other than truthful:
This is the greatest error that has ever been committed, the essential fatal-
ity of error on earth: one believed one possessed a criterion of reality in
the forms of reason-while in fact one possessed them in order to become
master of reality, in order to misunderstand reality in a shrewd manner. 19
"Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be found or discov-
ered-but something that must be created and that gives a name to a proc-
ess, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end-introducing
truth, as a processus in infinitum, an active determining-not a becoming-
conscious of somethin¢ that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word
for the "will to power. 92
Without God, morality cannot viably be based on any kind of moral
truth provided by rationality. Morality is simply not a function of reason. To
believe so is profoundly to misconstrue what morality is. Absent its divine
sanction, moral principles are a function, and a function only, of human
sanction. And human sanction is grounded upon nothing other than its politi-
cal power.
[T]here is discontent verging on despair whenever some theorist tries to
develop a system in which "found" ethical or legal propositions are to be
treated as binding, but for which there is no supernatural grounding. God's
will is binding because it is His will that it be. Under what other circum-
stances can the unexamined will of anyone else withstand the cosmic
"says who" and come out similarly dispositive? There are no such circum-
stances. We are never going to get anywhere (assuming for the moment
that there is somewhere to get) in ethical or legal theory unless we finally
face the fact that, in the Psalmist's words, there is no one like unto the
190. Id. at i4.
191. Id. at 315.
192. Id. at 298.
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Lord.193
Rational justification does not, and can not supplant God. Not only is
this philosophically the case; it is historically the case as well-as evidenced
by the progressive moral scepticism of the post-Enlightenment. 94 "The re-
sult of that realization is what might be called an exhilarated vertigo, a si-
multaneous combination of an exultant 'We're free of God' and a despairing
'Oh God, we're free."" 9 5 The ethical project of the Enlightenment to ration-
ally establish a universal morality abstracted from religious particularity has
therefore engendered an "[i]ntractable plurivocity and heteromorphic prolif-
eration" 196 characterized by relativistic ethical scepticism rather than moral
conviction. 197
Contemporary ethics is consequently morally indeterminate. 198 Practi-
tioners of ethical reflection are wont to diagnose this ethical condition as
"the crisis of liberal democracy,"' 199 which is increasingly afflicted by a "de-
clining sense of moral obligation, "200 and therefore prognosticate that "the
American experiment ... is in deep trouble," '' due to the fact that "[tlhe
prospects of reviving belief in the moral law are dim. '202 Absent cultural
consensus on the dictates of moral law, contemporary ethics is typified by a
193. Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1232
(1979).
194. "In the absence of some empirical truth about human nature or some transcendental
realm of moral reality, there is no indubitable source for securing our most cherished moral
values from a disabling skepticism." Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern
World, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 233, 236 (1994).
195. Leff, supra note 193, at 1233.
196. CAPUTO, supra note 8, at 222.
197. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 6 ("[T]he legacy of the Enlightenment has been the
provision of an ideal of rational justification which it has proved impossible to obtain. And
hence in key part derives the inability within our culture to unite conviction and rational justi-
fication."). See also Winter, supra note 194, at 236 ("[Tlhe genesis of modernity lies in the
conflict between reason and religion. On this familiar account, religious belief is seen as a
prejudice to be overcome because it is an obstacle to true and accurate knowledge about the
world. Accordingly, modem science begins with a healthy distrust of received dogma and an
insistence on reason and empirical proof. Applied to the domain of values, however, the skep-
ticism introduced by modem science and the attendant processes of secularization proves cor-
rosive.").
198. "One feature of our time is the fading of the moral law. The idea of a moral law ex-
ternal to us may never have had secure foundations, but, partly because of the decline of relig-
ion in the Western world, awareness of this is now widespread." GLOVER, supra note 5, at
405.
199. Daniel J. Mahoney, The Moral Foundations of Liberal Democracy, in PUBLIC
MORALITY, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND THE PROBLEM OF MODERN LIBERALISM 24, 38 (T. William
Boxx & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., 2000).
200. Jeffrey C. Alexander & Steven J. Sherwood, Mythic Gestures, in MEANING AND
MODERNITY 1, 11 (Richard Madsen et al. eds., 2002) (quoting ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE
BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN A TIME OF TRIAL xii (1984)).
201. Stanley Hauerwas, On Being a Christian and an American, in MEANING AND
MODERNITY 224, 225 (Richard Madsen et al. eds., 2002).
202. GLOVER, supra note 5, at 41.
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radical diversity of competing moral preferences based not upon rational
moral inquiry but upon moralistic posturing. 2°3 Such an ethical climate is
controlled not by substantive moral demands; it is controlled rather by the
merely procedural moral demand of egalitarian regard for such competing
moral preferences. 204 The moral autonomy of the individual reigns supreme
in a heteronomous ethical world.
The requisitely secular liberalism of such a heteronomous ethical world,
however, in its continuing effort to disestablish itself from any substantive
moral foundations, consequently establishes itself upon a procedural moral
foundation of ethical indetermination. 2 5 Liberal commitment to moral inde-
terminancy, which devolved from the failure of the Enlightenment project to
achieve rational consensus on ethical matters in abstraction from moral tradi-
tions, has itself come to comprise a moral tradition ethically determined to
preserve the liberal social order of accommodating competing moral prefer-
ences, but which liberal social order is therefore morally intolerant of any
moral preference that would dis-accommodate competing moral prefer-
ences. 26 The heteronomous ethical world of secular liberalism, therefore, is
distinguished not by a robust diversity of competing moral convictions, but
rather by a non-evaluative insipidity of competing individual preferences.0 7
"And so finally modem liberalism, born of antagonism to all tradition, has
transformed itself gradually into what is now clearly recognizable even by
203. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 343 ("[R]ival appeals to accounts of the human good
or of justice necessarily assume a rhetorical form such that it is as assertion and counterasser-
tion, rather than as argument and counterargument, that rival standpoints confront one an-
other."). See also Winter, supra note 194, at 236 ("With nothing else to secure moral justifica-
tion, diverse or conflicting social practices seem to stand beyond rational approval or
condemnation."); accord Hauerwas, supra note 201, at 232 ("[O]ur political culture has made
us quite literally speechless (though of course we go on talking, but such talking represents no
more than the clash of opinion).").
204. Taylor, supra note 7, at 190. Charles Taylor thus characterizes contemporary liberal
democracy as a "procedural republic." Id. ("Respect me, and accord me my rights, simply in
virtue of my being a citizen, not in virtue of my character, outlook, or the ends I espouse, not
to speak of my gender, race, sexual orientation, and so on.").
205. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 335-36 ("Every individual is to be equally free to pro-
pose and to live by whatever conception of the good he or she pleases, derived from whatever
theory or tradition he or she may adhere to, unless that conception of the good involves re-
shaping the life of the rest of the community in accordance with it .... And this qualification
of course entails not only that the liberal individualism does indeed have its own broad con-
ception of the good, which it is engaged in imposing politically, legally, socially, and cultur-
ally wherever it has the power to do so, but also that in so doing its toleration of rival concep-
tions of the good in the public arena is severely limited.").
206. Id. at 349 ("[L]iberalism, beginning as a repudiation of tradition in the name of ab-
stract, universal principles of reason, tumaed itself into a politically embodied power, whose
inability to bring its debates on the nature and context of those universal principles to a con-
clusion has had the unintended effect of transforming liberalism into a tradition.").
207. See Mark Blitz, Liberal Freedom and Responsibility, in PUBLIC MORALITY, CIVIC
VIRTUE, AND THE PROBLEM OF MODERN LIBERALISM 107, 111-12 (T. William Boxx & Gary
M. Quinliven eds. 2000) (arguing that liberal moral freedom has engendered an ethics of so-
cial acquisition characterized at best as an indeterminate voluntariness, and at worst as a bo-
vine self-absorption).
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some of its adherents as one more tradition. 2 8
The tradition of modem liberalism as a procedural republic of heter-
onomous moral indeterminancy is scarcely explicable, however, as the mere
historical consequence of a cultural diversification of competing religio-
moral traditions devolving into a proliferation of competing individual pref-
erences. Rather, the ethics of modem liberalism is explicable as itself a
moral tradition by virtue of its having devolved from a distinctly Judeo-
Christian religious heritage, which continues to provide for the central moral
conviction of our civic society despite its secularization.
The primordially controlling religious concept for the Judeo-Christian
understanding of human being is its creation in the image of God: "So God
created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and
female he created them. 209 By virtue of reflecting the divine image, absolute
worth is accorded human being.210 Judaism ascribes this absolute value of
humanity to every person.211 Within Judaism, however, the absolute value of
human being is not intrinsic to the being of human being, but is divinely
granted. Such divine regard may be withheld or withdrawn depending upon
fulfillment of God's will through obedience to the revealed Law of God (To-
rah).212 Although absolute, Jewish moral regard for human beings is not uni-
versal.213 Within its Christian heritage, however, divine regard for human be-
ing is fulfilled by the Son of God in the person of Jesus Christ. Through
Christ, humanity is freed from sin, redeemed before God, and exists in a
state of grace.214 Divine regard is therefore realized not through obedience
208. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 10.
209. Genesis, 1:27.
210. Michael Fishbane, The Image of the Human and the Rights of the Individual in Jew-
ish Tradition, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 17, 18 (Leroy S. Rouner ed.,
1988) ("For at the core of the biblical system is the perception that the person is of absolute
and inviolate worth: created in the divine image."). Fishbane notes that the biblical attribution
of absolute worth to human being distinguished early Judaism from other Near Eastern relig-
ions. Among the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Hittites, human life could be measured eco-
nomically in terms of the value of property or possessions: "[L]ife and property are commen-
surable values, used interchangeably in the legal system, there being presupposed an
exchange rate between persons and things." Id. The Bible allows no such economic valuation
of human being, and therefore permits no legal substitution of property for human life: "Who-
ever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own
image." Genesis 9:6.
211. Fishbane, supra note 210, at 17 ("The fundamental presupposition of the rights of
the person in Judaism is a belief in the absolute and compromisable worth of human life. This
belief is grounded in the unique value of the individual in the divine scheme of creation and is
variously articulated in both biblical literature and rabbinic tradition.").
212. Judaism has generally confined its absolute regard for human life to those of the
Jewish faith who, moreover, properly fulfill their religious duties as such. Id. at 25.
213. Not only has Jewish regard for the absolute value of human life been historically
confined to those of the Jewish faith who fulfill their religious duties as such, but certain cate-
gories of persons were not historically accorded full human status to begin with (e.g., idiots,
minors, women, androgenes, etc.). Id. at 26.
214. As the incarnation of divinity in humanity, the person of Jesus Christ rectified the
relationship between God and humankind-a rectification achieved not by human fulfillment
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(to the law), but through faith (in Christ): "If you continue in my word, you
are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will make
you free." '2 15 Christian freedom from Jewish law is therefore "granted by
God and received in faith." '2 16 The Christian is free from the burden of the
law by virtue of living in Grace. "For the law was given through Moses;
grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. ' 217 A leading theologian of the
twentieth century, Karl Barth, construes the Christian faith accordingly:
To believe means to believe in Jesus Christ. But this means to keep wholly
and utterly to the fact that our temporal existence receives and has and
again receives its truth, not from itself, but exclusively from its relation-
ship to what Jesus Christ is and does as our Advocate and Mediator in God
himself. ... [I]n faith we abandon whatever we might otherwise regard as
our standing, namely, our standing upon ourselves ... for the real standing
in which we no longer stand on ourselves ... but... on the ground of the
truth of God and therefore on the ground of the reconciliation which has
taken place in Jesus Christ and is confirmed by him to all eternity.
218
of the law, but by the Grace of God. Romans 8:3-4 ("For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ
Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death. For God has done what the law, weak-
ened by the flesh, could not do: sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin,
he condemned sin in the flesh, in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled
in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit."). Rectification between
God and humankind is thus entirely God's doing. Through Christ, therefore, humankind is
freed from the logic (or word) of law, and lives in the logic (or word) of Spirit whereby divine
Grace may be enjoyed fully and eternally: "For the wages of sin is death, but the free gift of
God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord." Romans 6:23. In essence, the law of God is ful-
filled in the person of Jesus Christ, which fulfillment is accorded by the Grace of God to all of
humankind.
215. John 8:31-32. The freedom referred to here is freedom from the burden of having to
fulfill the divine will through obedience to God's law: "For freedom, Christ has set us free;
stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to the yoke of slavery." Galations 5:1.
216. Trutz Rendtorff, Christian Concepts of the Responsible Self in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 33, 39 (Leroy S. Rouner ed., 1988).
217. John 1:17.
218. 2 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 159 (T. H. L. Parker
et al. trans., G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance eds., 1957). The truth of Jesus Christ is the
truth of the reconciliation between the divine and the human. For the Christian faith, Jesus
Christ reveals this truth by virtue of embodying this reconciliation. The truth that we humans
are constitutionally unable to realize is realized in the constitution of Jesus Christ. MATTHEW
A. RITTER, GOD AND TRUTH: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT;
SUBVERSION OF THE S/SUBJECT 158 (Unpublished Dissertation, Yale University, 1989) (dis-
cussing the metaphysics, philosophical and theological, of the Christian faith) (on file with
author). "Jesus Christ is the atonement. But that means that He is the maintaining and accom-
plishing and fulfilling of the divine covenant as executed by God Himself." 4 KARL BARTH,
CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 34-35 (G. W. Bromiley trans., G. W. Bromiley
& T. F. Torrance eds., 1956). The person of Jesus Christ thus renders/reveals full accord be-
tween divinity and humanity, and accordingly between God and all persons. Although this
accord is realized by Christ alone, it is revealed to humanity, the only proper response to
which is faith: "Believers 'are' the elect... so far as they bear witness to the truth, that is, to
the elect man, Jesus Christ, and manifest and reproduce and reflect the life of this one Elect."
2 KARL BARTH, supra, at 346. Constitutionally unable to realize the truth of the divine-human
accord itself, truth is realized for humanity by Jesus Christ. Humanity thus receives truth vi-
40
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The Christian understanding of being human is entirely a function of the
extraordinary value divinely granted to human being through the person of
Jesus Christ. This value is not only absolute; it is fait accompli. Through
Christ, all persons exist in the state of Grace by virtue of being human.
Christ rectified divine regard for human being. All humans participate in this
rectification. Divine regard for the individual is thus utterly independent of
anything the individual is or does. Grace is prevenient, it is achieved not by
human, but by divine effort in the person of Christ. The absolute value of a
person therefore pre-exists any social differentia, and is consequently uni-
versal. All persons are accordingly equal by virtue of no-thing-not by vir-
tue of anything a person is or does. Pre-established through Christ, divine
regard for humanity is absolute, universal, and egalitarian.
Universal egalitarian regard for the absolute value of the individual de-
volves from this radical freedom from the law provided by Grace in the per-
son of Jesus Christ. The Christian community of faith proclaims this free-
dom:
But now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law,
although the law and the prophets bear witness to it, the righteousness of
God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe. For there is no dis-
tinction; since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, they arejustified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in Jesus
Christ, whom God put forward as an expiation by his blood, to be received
in faith.219
The Christian community of faith is itself the communal incarnation of
Christ as proclaiming redemption through Christ.220 As the communal incar-
nation of Christ, Christian ethics is accordingly governed by the single moral
dictate of Christ as the Word of God: "I give you a new commandment: love
one another; just as I have loved you, you must also love one another."221
The law-whereby the human is reconciled with the divine-becomes
through Christ the singular commandment to be toward all others as Christ
was: to love-unconditionally, without regard to anything a person is or
does.222 Christian love is granted through divine grace-a function not of
cariously. Only through faith in its revelation may this truth be acknowledged and received.
"[T]he truth of man's being ... can consist in nothing other than in man's response with a
corresponding faithfulness to the way and work of God [in Jesus Christ], to God's faithful-
ness." Id. at 207. Reconciliation between divinity and humanity is therefore accomplished by
God, through the person of Jesus Christ, but for the salvific benefit of all human kind.
219. Romans 3:21-25.
220. "For where two or three are gathered in my name, there I am in the midst of them."
Matthew 18:20.
221. John 13:34.
222. Matthew 22:35-40 ("And one of [the Pharisees], a lawyer, asked [Jesus] a question,
to test him [on Jewish law]. 'Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the law?' And
he said to him, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,
and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, You
shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the law and the
41
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human achievement; Christian love is received in gratitude-as profoundly
undeserved.
Christian freedom from the law, however, does not mean unlawfulness.
On the contrary, Christian ethics merely deprives the law of its soteriological
significance-i.e., one may not acquire redemption before God through act-
ing lawfully. Religious freedom from the law permits moral freedom for the
law. Obedience to the law serves not religiously to rectify oneself with God,
but morally to manifest one's rectitude with God. Having been rectified with
God through Christ, one is free to act accordingly. Acting lawfully thus re-
mains a primordially religious activity;.23 it is performed, however, not out
of religiously self-interested motives to right oneself with God, but out of
moral interest to act rightly in accordance with the divine will as revealed
through the law.22 Hence the biblical remonstration against religious hypoc-
risy: "Woe to you.., hypocrites! For you tithe mint and dill and cumin, and
have neglected the weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and
faith .... 225
The religious heritage of the Judeo-Christian tradition thus accords ab-
solute, universal, and egalitarian value to all individuals-simply and only
by virtue of their being human. The Judeo-Christian tradition accordingly
provides for the inherent dignity of every individual human being simply by
virtue of being human and not by virtue of any other defining social charac-
teristic whatsoever. Following the philosophical lead of Enlightenment
thinkers-most notably Immanuel Kant, 26 and continuing through theologi-
cal efforts in the twentieth century-most notably by Paul Tillich,227 how-
ever, secularism has persistently sought to abstract this ethic from its reli-
gious ensconcement and therefore provide it a properly rational basis, hence
non-contingent upon adherence to any particular sectarian dogma. The ethics
prophets."'). When asked to clarify who one's neighbor is, Jesus responds with the Good Sa-
maritan parable, making it clear that neighbor encompasses all others, no matter how detest-
able. Luke 10:29-37.
223. "'Did not your father eat and drink and do justice and righteousness? Then it was
well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. Is not this to
know me?' says the Lord." Jeremiah 22:15-16.
224. "'Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it
to me .. ' 'Truly I say to you, as you did it not to one of the least of these, you did it not to
me."' Matthew 25:40, 45.
225. Matthew 23:23. The Jewish prophetic books are also replete with the same disaffec-
tion for self-serving religious ceremony over moral rectitude with the divine will. Isaiah 1:10-
17 ("Hear the word of the Lord, ... 'What to me is the multitude of your sacrifices?' says the
Lord; . . . 'Wash yourselves; make yourselves clean; remove the evil of your doings from be-
fore my eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do good; seek justice, correct oppression; defend the
fatherless, plead for the widow."'); Amos 5:21-24 ("I hate, I despise your feasts, and I take no
delight in your solemn assemblies.... Take away from me the noise of your songs; to the
melody of your harps I will not listen. But let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness
like an ever-flowing stream.").
226. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE
(1793).
227. See generally PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1951).
[Vol. 39
42
California Western Law Review, Vol. 39 [2002], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol39/iss1/2
2002] THE ETHICS OF MORAL CHARACTER DETERMINATION 43
of modem liberalism accordingly proclaims as its fundamental moral princi-
ple an absolute, universal, and egalitarian regard for the value of each human
being, but which regard refrains from reliance upon religious belief. In its
enthusiasm to elide religion from morality, secular esteem for the inherent
value of human being turns not on divine regard for the human, but on hu-
man self-regard. Such human self-regard consequently truncates the value of
human being into its autonomy: rational, independent, self-sufficient, unen-
cumbered and unconnected to others except by choice. For secularism, the
value of being human thus becomes intrinsic to its humanity-therefore not
a function of its endowment by divinity.
Absent its religious foundation, this secular egalitarian regard for all
persons profoundly re-construes the worth of the individual, yielding an eth-
ics that inverts the Judeo-Christian regard for others into a regard for self.
The Judeo-Christian tradition construes the absolute worth of the individual
as a function of divine regard. The truncation of this divine regard into hu-
man self-regard consequently transforms an ethics driven by unconditional
love of others into an ethics driven by unconditional self-interest. When
worth is granted, it is received graciously; when owned, it is demanded in-
dignantly. In its secular anxiety to abstract the human worth of the individual
from all differentia, particularly religious, liberal ethics collapses a uniquely
Judeo-Christian understanding of the absolute, universal and equal value of
all persons into the being of the individual. Secular morality is thus a trun-
cated inversion of religious morality.228
The ethics of modem secular liberalism as a procedural republic of het-
eronomous moral indeterminancy thus has a religious etiology that provides
for its historical force as a tradition. As a truncated inversion of religious
morality, secular morality trades upon an egalitarian regard for the dignity of
each individual, but which dignity it locates not in divine regard for the indi-
vidual to which the individual is morally obliged to respond, but in the self-
regarding moral autonomy of each individual. Moral "freedom [has come] to
mean freedom to pursue self-interest." '229 The primal movement of secular
ethics is active, not responsive. Secular ethics accordingly places the burden
of moral autonomy entirely upon the abstracted agency of the individual in
its perennial pursuit of self-interested preferences .230
Self-interested preferences are largely a function, however, not of moral
228. See HANS KUNG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN 27 (Edward Quinn trans., Doubleday &
Co., 1976) ("The different spheres of life were seen less and less from the standpoint of a
higher world. They came to be understood in themselves and explained in terms of their own
immanent laws. Man's decisions and plans came to be based more and more on these intrinsic
laws and not on the supposed will of supramundane powers.").
229. ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN A TIME
OF TRIAL xii (1984), quoted by Jeffrey C. Alexander & Steven J. Sherwood, Mythic Gestures,
in MEANING AND MODERNITY 1, 11 (Richard Madsen et al. eds., 2002).
230. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 337-39 (arguing that the central virtue of modem lib-
eralism is the ability effectively to bargain and therefore implement one's preferences as a
matter of prudential practical reasoning).
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agency but of social circumstance. 231 Although the secular ethics of modem
liberalism presumes each individual to possess an essential moral agency in
abstraction from the existential preferences toward which it freely acts, the
exercise of moral autonomy betrays a converse human reality. Moral agency
is primarily responsive to the social circumstances in which it acts.232 The
moral identity of the modem secular individual is accordingly engendered
not principally by moral inspiration but by pragmatic aspiration. 233 Few in-
deed are the individuals who would otherwise possess the strength of charac-
ter to bear the burden of their own moral autonomy.234 Competing moral
preferences within the heteronomous ethical world of secular liberalism
amount to little more than the avid expression of individuated feelings dic-
tated typically by social ambition of one sort or another as informed by a
myriad of rivaling personal, familial, cultural, racial, national, moral, reli-
gious, and economic concerns. 235 This comports with a liberal market econ-
231. As quintessentially expressed in the writings of and subsequent philosophical tradi-
tions founded by both Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, humans are irreducibly
situated in the factical historicity (Heideggerian) of their life forms (Witttgensteinian) as evi-
denced by the metaphysical primacy of language in the construction of reality. See MATTHEW
A. RITTER, GOD AND TRUTH: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT;
SUBVERSION OF THE S/SUBJECT pt. II, ch. 1 (Unpublished Dissertation, Yale University, 1989)
(on file with author). See, e.g., Winter, supra note 194, at 244 ("We are contingent beings in
the literal sense of the original Latin contingentem-'touching on all sides.' We are enmeshed
in contingency; we are inextricable from it.").
232. Winter, supra note 194, at 244 ("We are embodied in a field of social interaction
that is both our formative context and our own ongoing production. For us, there can be no
transcendence of the contingent social contexts that are, simultaneously, both constitutive of
the self and the field of action in which the self is always already implicated as a responsible
actor.").
233.
There is a painful contradiction between what modernity promises and what it de-
livers. It promises-indeed demands-intellectual, moral, and political emancipa-
tion. Yet it delivers an iron cage. Modem persons aspire to express themselves as
autonomous individuals, even as their choices are channeled into paths laid down
by the modem market economy and bureaucratic state.
Richard Madsen et al., Introduction, in MEANING AND MODERNITY ix, ix (Richard Madsen et
al. eds., 2002).
234. Cf. Den Uyl, supra note 187, at 88 ("If liberalism requires the widest possible lati-
tude for individual responsibility, then the issue we are left with is not whether liberalism is
connected with virtue or destructive of it, but rather whether the demands of liberalism for
virtue are too great for creatures prone to ignorance, prejudice, and weakness of will.").
235. See MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 343 ("[Moral] [s]tandpoints are construed as the
expression of attitude and feeling and often enough come to be no more than that."). Macln-
tyre further contends that the source of such moral attitudes and feelings remain largely unex-
amined and incoherent:
[Post-Enlightenment liberals] tend to live betwixt and between, accepting usually
unquestioningly the assumptions of the dominant liberal individualist forms of
public life, but drawing in different areas of their life upon a variety of tradition-
generated resources of thought and action, transmitted from a variety of familial,
religious, educational, and other social and cultural sources. This type of self
which has too many half-convictions and too few settled coherent convictions, too
[Vol. 39
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omy that valorizes a facile diversity in a programmatic effort to eradicate
fundamental difference so as to render all workers the same---effectively in-
terchangeable. 236 Although reigning supreme in the heteronomous ethical
world of secular liberalism, the moral autonomy of the modem individual is
principally governed social prudence.23 7
VI. PROBLEMATIC ETHICS OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER DETERMINATION
In a context designed to assess character, the bar encourages prudence
rather than principle. 23
8
Bureaucratic ethical inquiry into moral character thus inherits a heter-
onomous ethical world of moral indetermination, but within which world it
purports to pass determinate judgment on the moral autonomy of applicants
aspiring to the practice of law. The administrative determination of good
moral character is ethically problematic because it employs the moral princi-
ples of secular modernity in a post-modem world of indeterminate moral
prudence. It therefore trades on a profound ethical incongruity that under-
mines the very moral integrity it seeks to identify. By virtue of this ethical
incongruity, moreover, the administrative determination of good moral char-
acter dis-serves a state's constitutionally permissible interest in protecting
both the public and the legal system from harm, and services rather a consti-
tutionally suspect intrusion into the privacy rights of applicants to the bar.
The ethics of secular modernity demands a procedurally egalitarian re-
gard for the dignity of each individual, which dignity it therefore locates in
the self-regarding moral autonomy of each individual: rational, independent,
self-sufficient, unencumbered and unconnected to others except by choice.
many partly formulated alternatives and too few opportunities to evaluate them
systematically, brings to its encounters with the claims of rival traditions a funda-
mental incoherence which is too disturbing to be admitted to self-conscious
awareness except on the rarest of occasions.
Id. at 397.
236. Harvey Cox, Mammon and the Culture of the Market, in MEANING AND MODERNITY
124, 134 (Richard Madsen et al. eds., 2002). ("The Market God prefers individualism and
mobility. It needs to be able to move people wherever production requires. It is only ham-
pered when individuals have deep ties to families, local traditions, particular places. There-
fore, it wishes to dissolve these ties. In the Market's eyes, all places-and indeed all
persons-are interchangeable. The market prefers a uniform, homogenized world culture with
as few inconvenient particularities as possible."). The market economy of secular liberalism
thus engenders "a benign neglect of privatized differences." Richard Madsen et al.,
Introduction, in MEANING AND MODERNITY ix, ix (Richard Madsen et al. eds., 2002).
237. See Ann Swindler, Saving the Self, in MEANING AND MODERNITY 41, 53-54 (Rich-
ard Madsen et al. eds., 2002) ("[B]oth the institutional depletion and economic dynamism of
our era create pressure to strengthen the self, make it more autonomous, more independent.
The irony is that it is hard to develop stronger, more integrated, more genuinely autonomous
selves in an institutionally depleted social world.").
238. Rhode, supra note 10, at 584.
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Secular ethics consequently attributes an abstracted moral agency to the ex-
ercise of this autonomy. The administrative determination of good moral
character evaluates the character of this moral agency on the basis of previ-
ous misconduct--conduct subject to criminal, civil, administrative, political,
or medical sanction of one sort or another. It therefore presumes an intrinsic
autonomous moral agency that is either morally good or bad based upon the
extrinsic evidence of sanctionable conduct.239 Sanctionable conduct is pre-
sumptive evidence of badness; the absence of sanctionable conduct is pre-
sumptive evidence of goodness. 2' That this scarcely comports with the con-
ceptual grammar of what is generally meant by good moral character betrays
the ethical incongruity of an administrative moral character determination.
Relying upon a strong notion of autonomy to attribute a determinate charac-
ter to the intrinsic moral agency of an applicant, the administrative determi-
nation of moral character valorizes extrinsic conformity to ethically indeter-
minate heteronomous social standards. This reliance is not only ethically
problematic in both the attribution of a determinate moral character and the
attendant prediction of fitness to practice law; it naively misconstrues the
character of moral conduct.
The determination of good moral character as the absence of sanction-
able conduct dictates conformity to heteronomous social standards within a
culture of secular liberalism that procedurally eschews substantive moral
standards on the one hand, but morali stically imposes them on the other, al-
beit in an inevitably incoherent and historically histrionic manner. Hence the
curious legacy of good moral character determinations, which despite "the
most exacting demands of due process of law, ' 241 evidences a remarkably
unexacting imposition of vague and arbitrary moral standards when judi-
cially reviewed.242 The fact that very few administrative adverse moral char-
acter determinations ever reach judicial review-due largely to the inordi-
nate cost of appealing administrative determinations, both emotionally and
financially-obscures the true extent to which bar associations have imperi-
ously prevented entry into its membership.243 The administrative determina-
239. McDowell, supra note 46, at 328 ("We go to great lengths in professional education
and testing to ensure minimum adequate levels of expertise as a prerequisite to licensing. We
do little to ensure or develop the requisite moral character. We seem to feel it is either there or
not, and our certification through licensing is an attempt to attest to its presence.").
240. Id. at 329 ("'Good moral character' in this sense is primarily negative, signifying
that nothing drastically unethical is known about the candidate, or more minimally that the
applicant has never been convicted of a crime. In effect, we use a weak concept of moral
character and a strong presumption in favor of its presence.").
241. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 174
(1971) (Black, J. dissenting).
242. Ratcliff, supra note 49, at 488 ("Ambiguous notions of good character coupled with
vague tests for judging an applicant's character, have resulted in inconsistent results in bar
admission cases.").
243. Rhode, supra note 10, at 493-94 ("Although the number of applicants formally de-
nied admission has always been quite small, the number deterred, delayed, or harassed has
been more substantial. In the absence of meaningful standards or professional consensus, the
[Vol. 39
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tion of good moral character trades not on careful inquiry into the exercise of
an applicant's moral autonomy, but on moralistic "passion, prejudice, or per-
sonal hostility" 2 in regard to conduct nonconforming to ethically indeter-
minate social standards.245
More profoundly troublesome, however, is that the moralistically "ca-
pricious and prejudicial ' 246 imposition of ethically indeterminate social stan-
dards induces conformity to such standards. Good moral character becomes
principally a matter of prudence in the pursuit of a specific social preference
to practice law. 247 Because the administrative determination of bad moral
character is a function of an applicant's misconduct, the good moral charac-
ter of an applicant is more readily a matter of cleverness than ethics. 248 This
is problematic both pragmatically and ideologically. Pragmatically, in a pro-
fession devoted-at least in its more honorable moments-to championing
the rights of the unpopular, such an ethics of conformity does not well serve
the interests of the bar.249 Ideologically, what matters within an ethics of
conformity to indeterminate moral standards is "seeming, rather than being
moral. '25" The administrative determination of good moral character reduces
filtering process has proved inconsistent, idiosyncratic, and needlessly intrusive."). Given the
heightened level of inquiry for those who have engaged in misconduct in some way or an-
other, whether legally, administratively, politically, economically, or medically, every aspect
of an applicant's existence becomes grist for the mill of moral scrutiny. The emotional burden
of such inquiry is excessive. Moreover, the financial burden of challenging an adverse moral
character determination is extreme. In California, licensure attorneys typically charge a
$5,000 fee for representation at the administrative hearing and a further $20,000 retainer for
representation at the State Bar Court. Such costs are generally well beyond the financial
means of recent law school graduates.
244. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 347 (1866).
245. See McDowell, supra note 46, at 325 ("[Another] difficulty is caused by the appli-
cation of the concept of 'good moral character' to a series of problematic moral issues over
which there is currently ideological or political disagreement. Examples are questions of nor-
mality in sexual conduct, the degree to which drug use is immoral, the permissible extent of
dissembling in relations with others, the acceptable range of eccentric personal conduct or
opinions, etc. Good moral character has become a weapon in those conflicts. For example,
one person may argue that a strict code of personal conduct as defined by religious or moral
beliefs signifies good moral character, while another, not sharing that value position, might
argue that a tolerance of human differences is a greater hallmark of good moral character.").
246. Rhode, supra note 10, at 575.
247. Rhode, supra note 10, at 584 ("In a context designed to assess character, the bar en-
courages prudence rather than principle. Such spectacles devalue the concept of morality they
purport to maintain.").
248. See GLOVER, supra note 5, at 20 (arguing that in any bureaucratic ethical regime,
which "rig[s] the social rewards and penalties so that co-operation becomes a winning strat-
egy." A person wishing to avoid exclusion will engage in "a sophisticated calculation of self-
interest," such that "what matters is reputation and image, rather than what you are really
like.").
249. Cf. Rhode, supra note 10, at 512 ("And it is difficult to construe the bar's parochial
concerns as the kind of legitimate state interest normally required to restrain vocational
choice.").
250. GLOVER, supra note 5, at 20.
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morality to the appearance of morality. 251 Hence the profound ethical incon-
gruity of an administrative moral character determination: it confuses con-
formity to a morally indeterminate heteronomy with the exercise of moral
autonomy.
The administrative determination of good moral character exacerbates
this ethical incongruity by presuming, moreover, that its diagnosis of moral
character provides a prognosis of moral conduct. Given the constitutionally
permissible justification for the administrative determination of good moral
character, it serves ultimately a predictive rather than descriptive function
toward certifying that an applicant to the bar will not harm the public or
compromise the public image of the bar as a licensed attorney. 52 Because
the administrative determination of good moral character evaluates moral
character on the basis of previous conduct, it requisitely presumes that past
conduct is viably predictive of future conduct.25 3 The ethical fallacy of this
presumption is betrayed by its lack of empirical verification. 4 Should it be
disposed to ignore the judgment of those having professional expertise in
such matters, who have been uniformly unsuccessful in providing any em-
pirical justification for the claim that prior misconduct is a reliable predictor
of future misconduct,255 bureaucratic ethical inquiry would be well served to
note the long-standing legal proscription against allowing prior misconduct
as evidence of character. 256 The administrative determination of bad moral
character on the basis of prior misconduct further presumes that instances of
misconduct within one ambit of life augurs misconduct in others-to wit, in
the future practice of law. No evidence supports this presumption. 57 More-
251. McDowell, supra note 46, at 333 ("One questionable if not totally unacceptable use
of 'good moral character' is as a control mechanism, pushing professionals toward conformist
and safe behavior.").
252. Id. at 327 ("[T]the concept [of 'good moral character']is not used descriptively, but
as a basis for prediction.").
253. McChrystal, supra note 49, at 67 ("[Tlhe prevailing view of bar admission authori-
ties is that past conduct predicts future conduct."). See also Rhode, supra note 10, at 545-46
("[B]ar decisionmakers are all operating on one shared empirical premise. Their common as-
sumption is taht [sic] certain attitudes and actions are sufficiently predictive of subsequent
misconduct to justify the costs of certification procedures.").
254. McChrystal, supra note 49, at 68 ("Although this is a rational and attractive prem-
ise, it has not been proven empirically in the context of bar admission.") (referring to a study
commissioned by the American Bar Association in the early 1970's, which attempted to es-
tablish some psychometrically viable standards whereby to predict attorney misconduct, but
which was subsequently shown to be entirely unfeasible). See also Rhode, supra note 10, at
546.
255. Rhode, supra note 10, at 559 ("Even trained psychiatrists, psychologists, and mental
health workers have been notably unsuccessful in projecting future deviance, dishonesty, or
other misconduct on the basis of similar prior acts.") (citing J. MONOHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981) (U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services Mono-
graph); C. NETTER, RESPONDING TO CRIME 88-92 (1982); American Psychological Associa-
tion, Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978)).
256. See, e.g., FED. R. EvnD. 404(b).
257. Rhode, supra note 10, at 560 ("Not only do examiners and judges generally lack
[Vol. 39
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over, the administrative determination of good moral character on the basis
of regret of previous bad conduct and subsequent good conduct lacks em-
pirical support as well." 8 Perhaps most significantly, the pervasiveness and
interminability of attorney misconduct empirically obviates the viability of
such an administrative certification of good moral character for admission to
the bar.259
The governing rationale that ineluctably leads bureaucratic ethical in-
quiry to determine moral character on the basis of prior misconduct, despite
the wisdom of legal tradition and professionally propounded empirical evi-
dence to the contrary, is that it posits-in accord with its modem liberalist
heritage-an abstracted moral agency to be the object of its characterization
as either good or bad. Prior misconduct is consequently surmised as evi-
dence of a faulty moral agency in the exercise of its autonomy, which faulty
moral agency is therefore augured, absent rehabilitation, to misconduct itself
in the future. Rehabilitation is accordingly imagined as the moral repair of a
faulty moral agency, evidenced by regret of previous bad conduct and sub-
sequent good conduct. This liberalist conception of autonomous moral
agency devolves, of course, from an archetypically religious notion of the
soul-in its commission of sin, the soul becomes stained; purification is ef-
fectuated through penitent confession and righteous action toward redemp-
260tion.
Aside from its suspect conceptual dependence upon an archaic meta-
physics of moral agency, both philosophical and theological, such precon-
ceptions about the character of moral agency as evidenced by conduct and
regard for conduct inevitably occasion unbounded bureaucratic inquiry into
an applicant's life in regard to matters that may bear no reasonable relation-
ship to fitness for the practice of law.261 Because the purported object of
clinical expertise, they are dealing with highly circumscribed data. Decisionmakers are fre-
quently drawing inferences about how individuals will cope with the pressures and tempta-
tions of uncertain future practice contexts based on one or two prior acts committed under
vastly different circumstances. [A] half century of behavioral research underscores the vari-
ability and contextual nature of moral behavior: A single incident or small number of acts
committed in dissimilar social settings affords no basis for reliable generalization.").
258. Id. ("It is equally problematic to assume, as do most courts and commentators, that
individuals willing to acknowledge the error of prior misconduct are less likely to stray from
the path of righteousness in the future. Despite our historic faith in the confessional, current
research reflects that individuals' resistance to temptation and rem6rse for past transgressions
are 'completely independent or at best minimally interrelated."') (citing W. MISCHEL,
PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 26 (1968)).
259. McDowell, supra note 46, at 336 ("The claim that all licensed members of a profes-
sion have good moral character loses credibility if it is regularly falsified by examples of
egregiously unprofessional conduct.").
260. See PAUL RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EviL 37-41 (Emerson Buchanan trans.,
1967).
261. See Rhode, supra note 10, at 575, 577 (arguing that the scope of ethical inquiry is
unjustifiably expansive both spatially ("a vast amount of the biographical data demanded
bears no meaningful relationship to the legitimate objectives of bar certification. And the un-
disciplined scope of inquiry opens opportunities not only for unwarranted intrusions, but also
49
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moral scrutiny is the intrinsic character of the applicant's moral agency, all
extrinsic aspects of an applicant's life-literally everything an applicant has
ever done, said, or even thought-becomes relevant evidence of that charac-
ter. This allows for undue governmental intrusion into matters otherwise
constitutionally protected as private,262 or legislatively protected as ex-
punged, sealed, or pardoned.263 Such intrusion is dramatically exacerbated
by the ethically indeterminate standards of such moral scrutiny.264
Ironically, the expansive moral scrutiny directed at bar applicants to-
ward certification is not generally directed at bar members in disciplinary
proceedings.2 65 Such a disparity between attorney certification and attorney
discipline is both constitutionally and ethically problematic. The administra-
tive determination of moral character is justified only with regard to fitness
for the practice of law in order to protect the public and the legal system
from harm. Diagnostic inquiry into attorney misconduct should therefore
comport with prognostic inquiry into attorney misconduct. 266 The disparity
betrays a bar's operative interest in maintaining "a licensing ritual that too
often debases the ideals it seeks to sustain. 267 Under its constitutionally
permitted principles of ethical inquiry, a bar should be a good deal more
concerned about dictating attorney fitness than predicting applicant unfit-
for capricious and prejudicial inferences from irrelevant information.") and temporally
("[s]ince relatively few questions include any time constraints, their scope includes conduct
that may be so remote at the time of application as to bear no rational relationship to current
fitness to practice.")).
262. Id. at 584 ("To enlist applicants, their counselors, and references in disclosure of
highly personal information compromises fundamental notions of dignity and autonomy.").
263. Id. at 577 ("Requiring revelation of all arrests, or of juvenile or expunged offenses,
is particularly troubling in light of the statutory provisions in most states generally shielding
such information from compelled disclosure. The public policies underlying such legisla-
tion-that adverse inferences should not be drawn from conduct of marginal probative
value-are as applicable to bar certification decisions as to other licensing and employment
determinations."); accord May, supra note 9, at 208 ("Pardons, clemency, or convictions that
have been annulled or expunged should operate to completely eliminate the effect of a prior
conviction for purposes of occupational licensing laws.").
264. Rhode, supra note 10, at 493 ("In the absence of meaningful standards or profes-
sional consensus, [moral character inquiry] has proved inconsistent, idiosyncratic, and need-
lessly intrusive. We have developed neither a coherent concept of professional character nor
effective procedures to predict it.").
265. See McChrystal, supra note 49, at 71 ("These jurisdictions usually hold that the
standards of behavior for bar admission applicants are less defined and more expansive than
the ethical duties to which lawyers are bound. This produces the anomalous result that per-
sons must demonstrate a better moral character to be granted a license to practice law than to
keep it.").
266. Rhode, supra note 10, at 549 ("Insofar as the profession is truly committed to pub-
lic-rather than self-protection, the incongruity between disciplinary and certification proce-
dures is untenable.").
267. Id. at 494; accord Barton, supra note 30, at 449 ("Current entry regulations...
largely benefit existing lawyers. The entire onus of guaranteeing quality falls upon entrants to
the market, with the helpful side effect of limiting competition for existing practitioners.
Likewise, regulation of current lawyers is as unobtrusive as possible, leaving little ongoing
control for quality or competence.").
[Vol. 39
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ness.268 To deny applicant certification on the basis of a conceptually inco-
herent and empirically unjustified prediction of unfitness, and yet to retain
attorney certification under less stringent standards of fitness, is constitu-
tionally suspect, ethically incongruous, and renders meaningless the admin-
istrative certification of good moral character.
The administrative determination of moral character trades on an ethical
incongruity that conflates the exercise of moral autonomy with conformity to
heteronomous social standards. It consequently purports to determine moral
character by virtue of ethically indeterminate and therefore idiosyncratically
moralistic criteria, which inevitably occasions an unduly intrusive scrutiny
conducted on the basis of a conceptually incoherent and empirically unjusti-
fied prediction of fitness to practice law. A bar's bureaucratic ethical inquiry
toward the determination of moral character consequently tends to subvert
the very principles it endeavors constitutionally to serve-protection of both
the public and the legal system.269 By valorizing the appearance of morality
over morality, the administrative determination of moral character conduces,
rather, to the promotion of prudence over principle, which undermines the
very moral integrity it seeks to identify. Neither the public nor the public im-
age of the bar is well served by a bureaucratic ethical regime that inevitably
and invariably contributes to the moral malaise of its membership.
CONCLUDING UN-ETHICAL POSTSCRIPT
The lawyers, not the philosophers, are the clergy of liberalism.
270
In an ethically indeterminate world, a bureaucratic moral scrutiny is sin-
gularly unsuited to the determination of moral character. By virtue of certify-
ing applicants to the bar through a process of moral inquiry that is conceptu-
ally incoherent, empirically unjustified, ethically insipid, and constitutionally
suspect, the administrative determination of moral character conduces,
rather, to a moral calculus of self-interest that obviates the interest of the bar
in protecting the public and the legal system from the immoral. The mem-
bership of a bureaucratic ethical regime wears a gygian ring of moral seem-
liness. Moral seemliness scarcely comports with the otherwise noble profes-
sion of lawyering, to which is entrusted our very life and liberty.
Given its constitutional mandate to protect both the public and the legal
system from harm, the administrative resources currently devoted to predict-
268. McDowell, supra note 46, at 335 ("The formal professional structure must vigor-
ously weed out those who have acted unprofessionally and thereby damaged clients or others.
That consequence, however, should be based on objective criteria and actual acts of wrongdo-
ing, not subjective judgments and predictions.").
269. Cf. Rhode, supra note 10, at 563 ("Taken as a whole, the current certification proc-
ess is an extraordinarily expensive means of providing a dubious level of public protection.").
270. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 344.
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ing attorney misconduct on the basis of a determination of good moral char-
acter would be more productively spent upon dictating the good conduct of
attorneys on the basis of a determination of attorney misconduct.271 In the
ethically indeterminate world of post-modem liberalism, moral character is
simply not subject to determination by virtue of heteronomous constraints on
conduct. The bar should accordingly divest itself of the good moral character
business; as a bureaucratic regime, it is ethically inept.
271. Cf. McDowell, supra note 46, at 334-35 ("'Good moral character' is not something
the profession can warrant in any particular professional. This is not a judgment that "good
moral character" is unimportant, because it is a vital aspect of the status of professional, i.e., a
person who is concerned with the welfare of the client and who is loyal and trustworthy to-
wards that client. The problem is the reliability of predictions based on such limited informa-
tion. Abandoning the formal certification recognizes this reality by not making such a war-
ranty. It surrenders the pretense that clients need not take some responsibility for determining
the level of competence and the trustworthiness of the professional to whom they entrust their
affairs. Any sophisticated consumer of legal services already understands that licensing is not
an effective guarantee of either of these qualifications and that inquiries must be made.
Should we mislead less sophisticated members of the public about their personal responsibil-
ity in selecting adequate professional help?); accord Barton, supra note 30, at 441, 449 ("[A]
comparison between the current entry regulations and the supposed justification establishes
that the regulations are ill-fitted to the actual problem .... Current entry regulations largely
benefit existing lawyers. The entire onus of guaranteeing quality falls upon entrants to the
market, with the helpful side effect of limiting competition for existing practitioners. Like-
wise, regulation of current lawyers is as unobtrusive as possible, leaving little ongoing control
for quality or competence.").
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